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Abstract 
Land grabs in the wake of a disaster are nothing new. However this phenomenon 
gains certain particularities and interest when it happens within the current 
context of climate change policy initiatives and the global land rush. This nexus 
produces a new set of political processes containing new actors and alliances, 
legitimizations, and mechanisms of dispossession that set off a different pace for 
land grabs. This study explores this nexus which has the potential to swiftly 
reboot spatial, institutional and political land arrangements in poor communities 
on a large scale, globally.  
The gap in the scholarly literature found in the disaster – global land rush – 
climate change nexus was examined from the perspective of a local community 
devastated by the 2013 super typhoon Haiyan in central Philippines. Using a 
political economy lens, the study revealed that along with the dynamics of the 
structural and institutional environment, the interaction between the pro-reform 
social and state actors determines the nature, pace, extent and trajectory of the 
land struggle. The ‘state-society interactive’ approach highlights the political 
agency of both the state and social actors, particularly how they exercise their 
autonomy and capacity, and maximize channels within and external to the state 
to advance their claim. How the interplay of different institutions of climate 
change mitigation, land grabs and disasters interacts with the political processes 
of current land grabs is the focus of this study.  
Keywords 
Land grabs, climate change, disasters, Philippines, small islands. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
Land grabbing, disasters and climate change  
 
The familiar narrative of land grabs shows how fears of a global crises on food, 
fuel, finance, and climate drive financially-rich but resource-poor states to 
acquire offshore lands. Transnational corporations have capitalized on these 
fears, turning it into profit-making ventures by forging one-sided land deals 
with states that perceive these as lucrative sources of employment and taxes. 
But land grabs do not necessarily and always involve foreign capital. For 
purposes of this study, the following definition of land grabs is used: 
 
the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other 
natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms, 
carried out through extra-economic coercion that involves large-
scale capital, which often shifts resource use orientation into 
extraction, whether for international or domestic purposes, as 
capital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and 
financial crises, climate change mitigation imperatives, and 
demands for resources from newer hubs of global capital (Borras 
and Franco 2013:1725).  
 
Although widely understood to be driven by these convergent global crises, 
land grabs are also triggered by initiatives blanketed by well-intentioned 
environmental agenda like the transformation of productive lands into 
protected areas, nature reserves, and ecotourism sites (Zoomers 2010). As a 
result, land and its associated resources (e.g., water) are constantly revaluated 
and commodified, drawing in non-conventional actors such as corporate 
entities into agrarian conflicts. With numerous groups and individuals 
scrambling for limited resources, politics around land has amplified in recent 
years and created different trajectories of property rights, values, and relations 
(Borras et al. 2011, Feldman and Geisler 2012, McCarthy et al. 2012). These 
trajectories include the eviction of rural poor families from their land or their 
subjection to unequal contract-farming arrangements and/or labour relations 
in the capitalist market in their own lands. 
    
Land grabs and green grabs have been examined by numerous scholars 
(Edelman et al. 2013, Borras et al. 2011, Fairhead et al. 2012, White et al. 2012), 
yet new intersections around it continue to be uncovered including, among 
others, a nuanced understanding of how the interaction of climate change (CC) 
mitigation initiatives such as biofuel policies and REDD+1  that hold the 
potential for a socially-inclusive growth can lead to land grabs (ISS 2014).2 This 
study contributes to this intersection by investigating a correlated nexus 
                                                 
1 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhanced 
forest carbon stocks 
2 This fragment is one of the objectives of the MOSAIC project of the Institute of 
Social Studies, Den Haag, Netherlands. The project focuses on the interplay of CC 
mitigation policies and land grabbing, and its impact on conflict and cooperation in 
the fragile and post-conflict states of Myanmar and Cambodia (www.iss.nl/mosaic). 
2 
involving recurring events whose impact is devastating and large-scale and has 
the potential to swiftly reboot spatial, institutional, and political land 
arrangements in poor communities: climate change and disasters. 
  
Stories of land dispossession and displacement are repeated in many disasters 
caused by extreme weather events, geophysical hazards, and man-made 
conflicts: Hurricane Katrina and Rita and the displacement of many New 
Orleans residents (Adams et al. 2009), extended drought in the mid-80s in 
Northern Sudan which forced off the Hawaweer nomadic group from their 
lands (Haug 2002 cited in Reale and Handmer 2011), Pakistan and India 
earthquake in 2005 when tenants in rural and urban areas were prohibited by 
landowners from re-establishing their rental rights (Reale and Handmer 2011).  
 
In Sri Lanka, the 2004 Asian tsunami swept away homes of fishing communities 
who were forced to temporarily relocate to safer areas. This was the signal for 
the state to execute its market plan of converting the coastal fishing town into 
a high-end tourism area. This plan, designed with support from USAID, World 
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, was part of the state’s initiative to 
rebuild Sri Lanka’s economy after the end of its civil war. Fishing communities 
were perceived as obstructions to the realization of the grand design. The state 
saw the tsunami as an opportunity to “clean” the beach of unauthorized 
establishments and pursue its previously foiled plans (Klein 2007). Within 
months it approved national policies establishing buffer zones along the beach 
area, implemented relocation programs for families, and ensconced security 
forces in what have become private areas, all done under the tenet of “people’s 
safety and security” (Klein 2007). 
 
In Afghanistan, after the international conflict that started in 2001, 
reconstruction of road infrastructure and reconstitution of land rights were top 
priority areas for peace building (Unruh and Shalaby 2012). Road 
reconstruction was intended to lead to economic and livelihood recovery, 
facilitate the return of dislocated families, and resolve territorial claims gained 
or lost during the war. The situation reversed when the country’s weak 
customary and tenurial system intersected with increasing land values emerging 
from the reconstruction, prevalent corruption, and absentee landowners and 
their heirs who were displaced by the war. Post-disaster rehabilitation and 
mitigation efforts aiming to re-establish people’s lives and property rights were 
thus used as channels to dispossess them of their land. 
 
These cases show the politics underlying people’s eviction from their lands in 
the context of CC and disasters. Yet in many instances there is a tendency to 
overlook this politics and perceive the movement as a natural by-product of 
disasters (Feldman and Geisler 2012). People affected by calamities who 
eventually fail to cope with the loss of their resource base are assumed to be 
‘rational agents’ who will logically move out or migrate to other areas to find 
income (Feldman and Geisler 2012). The real forces behind the exodus are thus 
either ignored or tempered down in conversations (Feldman and Geisler 2012). 
The transformation of a short-term humanitarian problem into a long-term 
social crisis involving people’s rights to their land is discarded or overlooked. 
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Klein (2007) dealt with this politics when she analysed how powerful alliances 
of states and corporations, backed up by international financing institutions, 
capitalize on catastrophes to take control of public spheres and use these as 
market opportunities. Disasters erase physical boundaries, destroy metaphysical 
land arrangements, and create “blank slates” out of previously occupied 
landscapes. Market-driven plans lying around, waiting for years to be 
accomplished, are swiftly drawn on these landscapes, creating permanent 
changes. As US Republican Congressman Richard Baker was overheard saying 
to a group of lobbyists after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, “We finally 
cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did” 
(Klein 2007:4). His statement was supported by Joseph Canizaro, one of New 
Orleans’ wealthiest developers who said, “I think we have a clean sheet to start 
again. And with that clean sheet we have some very big opportunities” (Klein 
2007:4). Whose plans are drawn, by who, how, and why are the objects of 
intense political and economic processes underlying disasters. Calling it 
“disaster capitalism”, Klein (2007) reveals how capitalist forces capitalize on the 
collective trauma of affected communities to impose rapid and irreversible 
social and economic reforms before the survivors are able to recover and 
regroup themselves. These forces operate under the guise of humanitarian aid 
and pillage local and national economies with privatization and state contracted 
debt. Disasters are thus transformed into new markets (Klein 2007) with lands 
of the displaced communities as one of the commodities up for sale.  
 
Climate change mitigation policies and strategies have become sites of politics 
too as conversations around who should be responsible, why, and how are 
taken up (Compston and Bailey 2011). The implementation of CC adaptation 
strategies such as the relocation of community in low-lying and coastal areas is 
replete with these politics. These strategies and policies are generally built 
around principles of “do no harm”, “build back better”, and “safe and secure 
settlements”. However, when placed in the hands of powerful groups, the 
original intent of these strategies can be overturned to favour their interests.   
 
These events affirm that disasters and CC are not accidental but are instead 
shaped by dominant forces as part of its design to maintain hegemony. Partly 
anthropogenic, these events become breeding grounds for land politics and 
power relations where resources are controlled and people’s vulnerabilities are 
intensified (Hannigan 2012, Ribot 2014). Addressing it goes beyond 
technocratic, infrastructure-focused interventions and entails unearthing the 
structural violence, analysing histories and extractive relations, and social causes 
of the vulnerabilities (Quarantelli 2005 and Barton 2005 cited in Perry 2007, 
Ribot 2014). It is therefore important that these incidents be read not as past 
histories but as the current norm and trajectories of future disasters (Adams et 
al. 2009).  
 
What then happens to land and poor people when disasters hit sites of land 
struggle and create a sudden simultaneous crisis of resource scarcity and 
abundance of external capital in the form of humanitarian aid? How do the 
politics of CC interact with the ensuing land struggle and crisis? What happens 
to land when disasters traumatize communities and momentarily paralyze 
states, putting vulnerability and desire for survival at peak levels? What happens 
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to land when multiple actors in the international aid and CC arena bring with 
them multiple conflicting and complex objectives?   
 
These questions show that while there is nothing new about disasters 
facilitating people’s expulsion from their lands, this nexus gains certain 
particularities when it happens within the current context of CC policy 
initiatives and the global land rush. The latter taken here in its contemporary 
manifestation as explained in the beginning of this paper. The complex 
relationship between CC and disasters and dispossession is already complicated 
to study and tackle in policy terms – but situating this in the context of a raging 
global land grab has made it even more complicated and difficult to address in 
policy and political terms.  
 
Given the magnitude and potentially far-reaching and irreversible impact of 
disasters, intensifying climate-related hazards and global rush for land, and 
continuous land dispossession and displacement of people, finding out what is 
happening, how and by who becomes urgent. Apart from offering fresh 
insights on the nexus, answering these questions can potentially contribute to 
solidifying the relief-rehabilitation-development link that humanitarian actors have been 
struggling to realize over the years. The gap in the scholarly literature found in 
the disaster - global land rush – climate change nexus is the one being addressed by 
this study. It examines this nexus from the perspective of a local community 
devastated by the 2013 super typhoon Haiyan in central Philippines. 
 
Research Question   
 
Tensions around land dispossession, CC adaptation strategies, and the constant 
threat of another disaster generate a pressing need to unpack the complexity of 
this nexus. This study helps elucidate this nexus by answering the question: 
How do land grabs shape and are shaped by climate change and disaster-related 
adaptation strategies, policies and principles?  
 
Methods 
 
The study takes the case of a small island in the Philippines that was hit by 
Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. The intersection of these concepts was analysed by 
probing into the island’s history of agrarian land conflict, particularly how its 
institutional and political arrangements changed and were changed by CC 
adaptation strategies and disaster-related policies after the typhoon.  
 
As the study aims to deepen knowledge on these links using the different actors’ 
perspectives, the study gathered information that is pluralist which explores 
multiple competing causes, objectives, and interventions of the actors involved 
(Chambers 1983); processual which focuses on both the interaction and 
structure across time; and historical which looks into how these structures and 
context have evolved (Pettigrew 1990). Having this aim entailed using a variety 
of qualitative methods to complement each other’s strengths and limitations 
and to validate its data. These methods consisted of focus groups discussions 
(FGD), informal community discussions, and key informant interviews that 
were complemented by information from official state documents, NGO 
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reports, documents of the farmers’ federation, and annual reports of the private 
firms. These methods were used to gain insights into 1) the land tenure situation 
prior to and after the disaster (e.g., land ownership, existing tenurial 
instruments), 2) the Philippine agrarian policy environment, 3) the contending 
groups, their claims and strategies for advancing these, 4) the interaction of the 
state, powerful elite, and farmers, and 5) how these changed the results of the 
land conflict and the nature of CC and disaster-related policies. 
 
In line with the pluralist view, the study interviewed all important actors 
involved in the conflict: from the Minister of Environment and Natural 
Resources, the external point person of Ayala Corp. (the corporate elite) for its 
typhoon Haiyan operations, the communications head of the Office of the 
Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery3, the vice-president of 
SIDECO (private firm of local landowners) to local state officials, 
representatives of nongovernment organizations (NGO) supporting the 
community, and the local communities themselves (see Appendix A for the list 
of people interviewed). The Minister of Agrarian Reform, who is a key figure 
in this case as it involves the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 
(CARP), begged off from being interviewed since the case is still being 
processed by his Department. Instead a copy of their latest decision on the 
matter was provided to the researcher. Similar to the study of Glick et al. (1990), 
having multiple informants in this study helped validate and resolve 
discrepancies in the information gathered across the interviews.   
  
To help analyse the conceptual links, the study used different analytical 
variables such as institutions defined here as “the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship 
between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986). It 
also investigated the background (e.g. ideology, interests, and capacities) and 
interaction of three categories of actors involved in the conflict: social actors, 
state actors, and corporate elite. Social actors are defined as ‘groups of people 
who identify common interests and share ideas about how to pursue them’ (Fox 
1992:23). State actors are defined as ‘groups of officials whose actions push or 
pull in the same political direction’ (Fox 1992:29). They are not to be treated as 
a single group but as composed of individuals that can form different groups 
depending on their goals and actions. Using state actors rather than agency as 
a unit of analysis highlights the importance of the variations in their autonomy 
and capacity that influence the state (Fox 1992: 19). The last category is the 
corporate elite, which refers to the business conglomerate that controls 
substantial economic resources in-country and offshore giving them a certain 
degree of influence over a country’s economic and political direction. Together, 
the interface of these institutions with the interaction of these groups provide 
the study’s main area of analysis.  
 
The study was conducted in a site where the alliance of powerful elites and the 
state is dominant and where the local people are divided. Ensuring that all sides 
of the issue were heard thus proved to be challenging, especially as the 
                                                 
3 OPARR is the coordinating body assigned to put together an over-all strategic vision, 
coordinate, monitor and evaluate rehabilitation plans and programs of the local states 
for Typhoon Haiyan. 
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landowners initially prohibited the researcher from entering the island and 
interacting with the farmers. The landowners finally relented after the 
researcher gained their trust by giving them the space to express their views and 
by stating that the study will be used for academic purposes. The same strategy 
was used to gain the confidence of state actors and local communities. The 
novelty of the post-rehabilitation efforts of the Philippine state for Typhoon 
Haiyan was also a good invitation for the state agencies to share with the 
researcher their role in these initiatives and their perception of the conflict as it 
takes place within this context. It also helped that the researcher worked with 
PROGRESO, the nongovernment organization (NGO) that has been 
supporting the farmers, to obtain the latter’s trust and to connect with other 
individuals and groups working on the issue.  
 
Participatory observation was used to complement and validate data gathered 
from the interviews. This included living with host families in the island and 
joining their informal gatherings at night where candid stories about their land 
struggle incessantly flow. These gatherings were maximized to gain the trust of 
people, obtain insights that are not expressed in a big group and yet are valuable 
to the investigation, and verify previously gathered information. For the most 
part of the field research, the researcher lived at the office of PROGRESO 
which provided the space for in-depth discussions with the staff about the land 
struggle that helped contextualize data from the interviews. PROGRESO also 
had most of the pertinent documents on the case and knew key informants in 
the case which facilitated the fieldwork.  
 
Scope and Limitations  
 
The phenomena of disasters and land grabbing have each been investigated in 
numerous literature.4  However, new perspectives on how it interplays within 
the context of a political CC arena and the global land rush are still scant. The 
study does not attempt to give a comprehensive analysis of land dispossession 
cases in the country as it only concentrates on specific elements relevant to its 
main question. The study also takes place in a small island where conditions 
may differ from other areas. Notwithstanding these limitations, the study hopes 
that its results and lessons will be useful for future studies on this matter.  
 
The study takes place in the Philippines, which is globally ranked by the Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) as among the top five 
countries that have experienced the highest number of disasters caused by 
biophysical hazards over the last decade (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012).  The 2008 
Climate Risk Index ranked the Philippines on the top spot of countries most 
affected by extreme weather events in 2006 (Integrated Regional Information 
Networks. n.d.). In 2011, the country topped CRED’s global list with 33 of the 
332 natural disasters worldwide occurring in its shores (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
4 On disasters:  (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012, Klein 2007, Middleton and O'Keefe 1998, 
Jayasuriya and McCawley 2010, Unruh and Shalaby 2012) among others. On land 
grabbing:  (Scoones et al. 2013, Borras et al. 2011, Feldman and Geisler 2012, White 
et al. 2012) among others.  
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Chapter 2: Analytical Framework 
 
A political economy approach to post-disaster 
economic investments and land struggles  
 
Believing in the infallibility of the market and its auxiliary institutions to 
eradicate poverty, scholars of New Institutional Economics (NIE) assert that 
post-disaster interventions should focus on restoring institutions that will help 
poor people access these markets. This ideology has guided World Bank’s 
(2000:19) response to addressing high levels of hazard vulnerability among 
emerging economies: “Indeed in addressing both hazard vulnerability and post-
disaster response, more attention needs to be paid to economic activities, rather 
primarily to the protection of economic assets.” 
 
Its multi-billion post-disaster recovery loans are deemed to reduce the layers of 
complexity arising out of a disaster situation by rearranging market institutions 
that will induce investments and inject new capital (Deininger et al. 2010). This 
assumes that when capitalists take over the lands of disaster-affected 
communities, negative outcomes are not necessarily produced. Along the same 
ideological tradition albeit in a different context, Popkin (1980:482) succinctly 
puts it: these new arrangements are “generally not a last-gasp response to 
declining situations, but a response to new opportunities”. 
 
Yet despite the deluge of external aid, accounts of disaster survivors losing their 
lands and living worse than they were prior to the disaster are well documented. 
One is therefore left to ask: Why has the market and its auxiliary institutions 
failed to protect people’s access to land and improve the living conditions of 
disaster survivors despite the overflowing capital from external aid?  
 
The lens of agrarian political economy offers more compelling counter 
arguments against this dominant market-oriented ideology. It posits that 
markets and its institutions are not simply givens but have shaped, and are 
shaped by, past and present power relations among different classes. Resolving 
market’s inability to respond to explicitly pro-poor processes and outcomes 
therefore requires more than adjusting market policies and programs. It entails 
a historical analysis of the wider social processes and power struggles in which 
positions of domination, subordination, and exploitation occur in between and 
among social classes. This lens is summarized into four fundamental questions 
that can be applied across different sites and scales of economic activity, and to 
different types of society at different historical moments: Who owns what? 
Who does what? Who gets what? What do they do with it? Bernstein (2010:22-
24) explains the implicit sequence in these questions: 
 
social relations of property shape social divisions of labour, 
which shape social distributions of income, which in turn shape 
the uses of the social product for consumption and reproduction 
– which, in the case of capitalism, includes accumulation. 
 
Land struggles are products of social relations of different classes. These are 
complex environments of competing interests and agenda defined not solely by 
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the class divisions but also by the class’ experience of capital and oppression 
which produces a contrasting mix of constructions and attitudes towards their 
land and the struggle (Borras and Franco 2013). Recognizing the fluidity and 
complexity of class divisions and how these parallel or overlap with other social 
divisions to influence land struggles, the approach therefore also asks: What do 
they do to each other? As Bernstein (2010:117) succinctly puts it: “All such 
struggles are shaped universally but not exclusively by class dynamics, which 
combine in complex ways with structural sources and experiences of other 
social contradictions.” 
 
Accumulation by dispossession, green grabbing, and 
disaster capitalism 
 
Spurred by the global crises and the crisis of capital overaccumulation, state and 
capitalists apply a “spatio-temporal” fix where an external “other” is created by 
capital to absorb its surplus and access cheaper inputs (Harvey 2003). New 
markets are thus opened and production systems and associated relations are 
reorganized (Harvey 2003). However instead of solving the crisis, it produces a 
wide range of violent and non-violent processes that lead to “accumulation by 
dispossession” (ABD) (Harvey 2003). These processes include the use of either 
or a combination of consent or coercion and non-market or market-driven 
strategies to control and profit from factors of production such as labour and 
land, and suppress people’s rights to access these resources. According to 
Harvey (2003), consent seeks legitimacy for dominant class power by 
constructing hegemony anchored on higher order values (e.g. freedom, 
democracy, equality) and the need to restore a sense of moral order. But in 
cases when counter populist or social democratic movements attempt to 
subdue the dominant interests, coercion or the use of force and non-market 
based strategies are applied. In many cases, these two strategies work together 
with consent to provide a climate of legitimacy for coercive tactics (Harvey 
2003).  
 
Disasters facilitate the application of this spatio-temporal fix by creating ‘blank 
slates’ of land.  Corporate elites and the state take over the land of rural poor 
inhabitants using new business models and different terms of exclusion (and 
inclusion) to create new enclosures. Capitalizing on disasters depends on how 
fast the dominant elites and the state can change the spatial, political, and 
institutional landscape, and execute its plans (Klein 2007). It depends on how 
far they can take advantage of people’s trauma to overrule the latter’s articulated 
needs and garner positive support for their corporate investments. According 
to Hilhorst and Jansen (2010), the humanitarian field is a political arena where 
different actors use its language and principles to legitimize their operations and 
interests in a crisis situation. These enable the actors to portray themselves as 
apolitical and fair, which helps conceal and yet advance their real intended and 
unintended purpose (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). Hence, what appears as “land 
grabs” become “reimagined in mainstream discourse as necessary and 
‘responsible investment’” (Borras and Franco 2013:1724). Conversely, the 
principles are contextual whose meanings can change depending on how it is 
translated and used in everyday practice. Hence, these are seen as “socially 
negotiated and acquiring meaning in practice” (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010:1121).  
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Apart from the humanitarian field, growing narratives and representations of 
the green agenda are being used by dominant elites and the state to justify their 
claims and authority behind the accumulation and nullify the land rights and 
claims of previous land occupants (Corson and MacDonald 2012). These so-
called “green grabs” involve a new range of unlikely actors such as 
environmental organizations, mining companies, and philanthropists that are 
embedded in capitalist networks and who form themselves into alliances 
(Fairhead et al. 2012). The strength of these new alliances allows it not only to 
enclose frontier lands but also reconstruct the lives of people living in the area 
(Fairhead et al. 2012). For instance, those who follow the prescribed logic and 
requirements of the market are labelled as environmental warriors while those 
who resist are excluded. This exclusivity partly becomes the breeding ground 
for inter-community conflicts that powerful alliances capitalize on using force, 
regulation, and legal and market mechanisms. With these newly formed 
partnerships, resource governance is thus restructured as power relations are 
realigned, new institutions are created, and different business models and new 
patterns of resource governance are followed  (Corson and MacDonald 2012).   
 
Recasting spatial and institutional arrangements  
 
Inherent in land grabs is a reciprocal interplay between its political processes 
and institutions that shapes the spatial, institutional, and political configurations 
of current land conflicts. Spatial arrangements, for Harvey (2006), involve one’s 
organization of the material and tangible things in space. It also involves one’s 
representations of these material realities that in turn are shaped by their 
histories, ideologies, identity, and experiences over time. The interplay of these 
multiple dimensions of space accounts for the politics of resources. This 
politics emerges as incongruences in understanding of a particular phenomenon 
are forcedly fit into a unified endeavour.5 Resolving this therefore requires 
institutions such as state and non-state policies to accommodate context-
specific dimensions of space and the dialectical tensions within it rather than 
be applied in absolute terms (Harvey 2006:123).   
 
In as much as this land grab phenomenon rearrange space, its inherent political 
processes shape and are shaped by institutions. “Institutional dynamism” as it 
is called goes beyond mechanical, static accounts of change but explores the 
“political conditions under which particular institutions have specific 
consequences” (Steinmo and Thelen 1992:16). Steinmo and Thelen (1992: 16-
17) identify four sources of institutional dynamism in which the impacts and 
consequences of institutions over time and within countries are explored. It is 
worthwhile to note these sources since the inherent political conflicts within 
the intersection of land grabs-climate change-disasters are strongly influenced 
by the links of old and new institutional arrangements of resource governance. 
 
1. Broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context can produce 
a situation in which previously latent situations suddenly become 
salient, with implications for political outcomes 
                                                 
5 Scott (1998) demonstrates this as he describes how land conflicts emerge from the 
state’s tendency to simplify unwritten, dynamic, and fluid histories and customary 
resource regimes through a single record that it can fit into its administration grid.  
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2. Changes in the socioeconomic context or political balance of power 
can produce a situation in which old institutions are put in the service 
of different ends, as new actors come into play who pursue their 
(new) goals through existing institutions 
3. Exogenous changes can produce a shift in the goals or strategies being 
pursued within existing institutions – that is, changes in outcomes as 
old actors adopt new goals within the old institutions 
4. Dynamism can occur when political actors adjust their strategies to 
accommodate changes in the institutions themselves.  This can occur 
in moments of dramatic change…but it can also be the result of more 
piecemeal change resulting from specific political battles or ongoing 
strategic manoeuvering within institutional constraints.  
 
One institution playing a central role in land grabs is the state and non-state 
regulatory (e.g. religious laws, local customary laws) orders that co-exist and 
contend with each other - sometimes referred to as ‘legal pluralism’ (Franco 
2011). In this situation, the relative importance of a set of rules to others varies 
over time and across locales as groups compete to make a set of norms, rules 
authoritative in a specific context (Franco 2011). The prevailing regulations will 
“define the power resources and options available to parties in conflict, 
influencing who will use which specific field of law, when, and how” (Franco 
2011:9). Each of these overlapping and contending regulatory fields carries with 
it a specific set of norms and procedures that can advance or draw back either 
of the opposing group’s claims. It can also produce shifts in power balance and 
change configurations of social forces. Its interplay thus creates the context 
where social and legal relations are obfuscated and conflicts occur (Franco 
2011).   
 
While institutions have an important role in constraining and refracting politics 
that produce land conflicts, it is not the sole cause and determinant of its 
outcomes as other socioeconomic variables can come into play (Steinmo and 
Thelen 1992). It is apparent from the sources of institutional dynamism that 
the political agency of contending groups and individuals influences these 
conflicts. Contending actors act on opportunities and manoeuver their way 
within new institutional arrangements created by shifting conditions to advance 
their claims. In his work on social movements and conflicts, Tarrow (2011:33, 
160) refers to these opportunities as “political opportunity structure” that 
groups take advantage of to advance their claims. These opportunities are 
created when contending groups are able to maximize changes in opportunities 
and decrease the levels of threats (e.g. availability of allies, rifts within elites, 
decline of state’s capacity for repression). Such openings can produce 
contentious politics that in many cases can lead to changes in regimes. The 
political agency of these actors to manoeuver within and around these new 
arrangements not only filter the impacts of institutions but also “influence the 
institutional parameters within which their interactions occur” (Steinmo and 
Thelen 1992). The overlapping legal fields therefore are not static as these shape 
and are shaped by interactions of contending groups (Franco 2011). 
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State-society interaction in land conflicts 
 
Land conflicts are complex phenomena that can be understood by analysing 
why and how certain land reform policies succeed or fail in the context of 
political contestations between state and social forces. Fox (1992) explains this 
complexity using an approach that focuses on “the interaction between state 
and society, the institutions that mediate such interaction, and the factors that 
account for how those institutions are in turn transformed” (Fox 1992:39). This 
approach thus considers institutions as both objects and contexts of conflicts 
within and between the state and society. Unlike other approaches, it does not 
adopt a one-dimensional view of the state and society, where one is either weak 
or unified, passive or active. Rather, it recasts notions of state power by 
considering the degree to which it can set its own goals independent of external 
interference (autonomy) and its capacity to act on these goals (capacity) (Fox 
1992:12). Social actors on the other hand are not mere spectators of changing 
contexts but, much like the state, have the autonomy and capacity to engage 
with these changes, and define and accomplish their goals (Fox 1992:24). In 
many instances, both autonomy and capacity may not be simultaneously 
present but the strategic interaction between state and society can change the 
context and account for unexpected political outcomes (Fox 1992).  
 
To understand this interaction and the competing forces, it uses two concepts: 
access routes and policy currents. Access routes are internal divisions and 
contradictions within and among state actors and agencies that create 
opportunities for social actors to pursue their claims in the state (Fox 1992). 
Based on their location in the state structure and the constraints and 
opportunities provided by the institutional environment, state actors belonging 
to the same agency can have different conflicting perception and action towards 
land conflicts. These institutional parameters are borne out of the agency’s 
ideology, orientations and administrative tasks and the efforts of the state to 
balance its dual conflicting tasks of capital accumulation and preservation of 
political legitimacy (Fox 1992). Sometimes these divisions are simply borne out 
of individuals protecting their positions in the structure for career 
advancement.  
 
“Policy currents” meanwhile are new alliances among social actors and 
sometimes the state that serve as channels for advancing or blocking land 
reform policies (Fox 1992). Similar to access routes, these alliances develop 
strategies to push the state to move towards the same direction as their cause. 
These strategies can include mobilization and negotiation to influence the 
state’s response and threats of withdrawal of a vital resource in the country (e.g. 
capital) to shape the state agenda (Fox 1992).  
 
The presence of access routes and policy currents create pressure “from above” 
and “from below” that bring both state and social actors into an interactive 
relationship that can then “offset the power of entrenched authoritarian elites 
and may well account for rural reform dynamics across a wide range of political 
systems” (Fox 1992:8). Borras (1998) argued that while this approach does not 
automatically guarantee the success of reform policies, it increases the 
program’s chance of succeeding by weakening the resistance of anti-reform 
groups. For Borras and Fox, it is by looking into structural and institutional 
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factors and the interaction between pro-reformists social and state actors that 
one can understand why distributive policy reforms fail or succeed.  
 
The emergence of these policy currents and access routes provide the 
opportunities for popular resistance to occur within formal and official 
channels. “Rightful resistance”, as it is called, is done in accordance with 
prevailing state structures and institutions. Therefore it does not subscribe to 
the view that state instruments are inaccessible to the marginalized but rather 
are sources of entitlement, inclusion, and empowerment (O'Brien 1996). 
Rightful resisters find their way to exploit and manoeuvre around these 
instruments to create disruptions and pressure those in power to adhere to 
promised legal commitments and established tenets. One such tenet is the 
“subsistence ethic”. This ethic expects society to respect the subsistence needs 
of peasant households living very close to the subsistence margin and that have 
very limited options for maximum gain (Scott 1976). Local communities are 
moved to resist when this ethic is violated and their notion of economic justice 
and exploitation (or “moral economy”, for short) has been challenged (Scott 
1976). People will resist not based on how much was taken but on how much 
was left for them to subsist (Scott 1976). Working within the state legal system, 
they will not use unlawful force or other criminal behaviour which can weaken 
their standing and discourage supporters (O'Brien 1996). However, they will 
engage in noisy, public, and open acts to get the support of justice advocates 
and to proclaim their allegiance to ignored values.  
 
Do local communities react and mobilize in a unified fashion? Borras and 
Franco (2013) assert that the political decisions and actions of affected social 
groups over land deals are influenced by several factors. First, there are the 
overlaps and intersections between class and other identities, and their 
experience of capital and oppression. Second, it depends on whether they will 
have a place to transfer or relocate to and whether they are absorbed in other 
productive sectors of the economy. Third, they consider whether they will 
receive compensation for their expulsion and have formal or community-
recognised rights to the land. Fourth, whether the situation threatens to lead 
them to a subsistence crisis. Fifth, the presence of political opportunity 
structures and their ability to maximize these. Institutional overlaps also 
influence how people would frame the struggle, the claims they will make, and 
the institutional frameworks they will use and challenge. These factors help 
explain what people do to each other (recall discussion on Bernstein) and reflect 
the different dimensions of space that Harvey asserts should be considered 
when implementing policies. Land deals, in sum, will affect members of the 
social groups differently depending on their space locations and can create 
cracks within social mobilizations from below (Borras and Franco 2013). 
 
 
*** 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced political economy as an analytical lens for 
studying contested politics inherent in land grabs occurring within a disaster 
and CC context. To understand this politics therefore is to unpack not only the 
structural and institutional arrangements but also the interaction of state and 
social actors. In the next chapter, we start investigating the institutional 
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arrangements within the study site by looking into the dynamic policy 
environment of the Philippines, an environment wrought with anti-reform 
obstacles while simultaneously providing opportunities for pro-reform groups 
to advance their land claims.  
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Chapter 3: Overview of Country Context 
 
Drivers of the Philippine economy 
 
Past and current state administrations recognize the significant contribution of 
the service and industry sectors to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
in the past decade. The service sector constituted half of the total GDP 
followed by the industry sector which consistently contributed around 30 
percent (NSCB. 2014). In contrast, the agricultural sector’s contribution has 
consistently declined from 29 percent in the late 1940s to 14 percent in 2000 
and down to 12 percent in 2010 (NSCB 2014). The first two sectors, dominated 
mostly by elite capitalists, naturally garnered the policy support of the state. 
Public-private partnership is promoted. Energy and resources are spent to push 
corporate-led development of economic investment areas and set up 
investment locations, including conversion of agricultural lands to industrial 
and urban uses.   
 
Tourism is one of the country’s top service industries that have consistently 
contributed to the economy, making up six percent of the country’s annual 
GDP from 2000-2011 (DOT 2011). Unsurprisingly, the aim of the Ministry of 
Tourism to have 10 million international visitors in 2016 has earned the support 
of the state administration, including the Minister of Environment and Natural 
Resources. In an interview with this author, the Minister said that prospects for 
income from tourism is high, especially if these tourism areas are transformed 
as timeshare properties of clients from the Global North. 6 In fact, he supports 
opening forestlands for tourism purposes if good ecotourism plans are in place. 
Accompanying this growth of the tourism industry is the real estate industry 
whose gross value added from 2012 to 2013 alone rose to 18.3 percent. 
 
The strong performance of both industries is straining the country’s remaining 
frontier and agricultural areas which are being converted into leisure landscapes 
and industrial zones. These frontier areas include much-coveted small islands 
whose untapped forest and coastal areas, and accessibility to mainland and 
other small islands have been attracting foreign and local investors.  
 
Conflicting land policies and mandates 
 
The CARP is a program carved from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law 
(CARL) of 1988 that aims to correct past inequalities between landlords and 
landless farmers and farmworkers by redistributing public and private 
agricultural lands to the latter.  
 
Since its commencement in 1988, CARP claims to have redistributed about 6 
million hectares (ha) of land to more than 3 million peasant households by 
2006, an estimate below the optimistic estimates of its advocates but beyond 
                                                 
6 Personal interview with Minister Ramon Paje at the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources office on 7 August 2014 (hereafter, Paje interview). Note: I apply 
the more commonly used term “Minister” in this paper – rather than the Philippine 
term of “Secretary”. 
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the pessimistic estimates of its critics (Borras 2007). Although validly contested, 
Borras (2007) points out that this estimate already constitutes significant gains 
in redistributive reform. Still, CARP’s implementation continues to be derailed 
by persistent property rights problems, slow resolutions of land cases by the 
courts and state agencies, fraudulent acts and politicized decision-making 
within state agencies, and overlapping and contradicting state land policies, 
among other reasons. In many cases, these state laws conflict with each other 
because these emerge from various social fields such as housing, water, 
agriculture, mining, all of which with different interpretations of land use and 
occupation. As noted by Franco (2011) earlier, this phenomenon inevitably 
produces conflicts because it renders opaque which law is authoritative. 
Consequently, this obscures whose claims and what rights to uphold, and how 
land should be appropriated and used in a particular context.  
 
This complex scenario is confounded by the co-existence of state and non-state 
laws such as the cacique law, which bequests informal authority and control to 
powerful landed elites over wide tracts of land that they own (Franco 2011). 
According to Franco (2011), this informal law exists predominantly in the 
Philippine countryside and is a central feature of many land grabbing cases. In 
these lands, the elites’ private authority undermine public authority and their 
rules are imposed through private armies and farm overseers. A close network 
of local public authority allies, including local litigation courts, protects their 
operations which oftentimes are obscured from the national media and state, 
especially those that happen in remote areas. While its control may not 
necessarily cover all aspects of people’s lives, cacique law has made its mark on 
the state’s land reform initiatives by disrupting many titling procedures. This 
law provides the powerful landed elites and their cohorts authority to use 
coercive and consent tactics (recall discussion on ABD). These tactics push 
farmworkers, voluntarily or involuntarily, to waive or sell their land titles and 
pressure some local agrarian state officials to delay the titling process. In some 
cases, the rural poor know more about the cacique law than the state law, which 
is often perceived as absent and distant (Franco 2011). 
 
In recent years, the urgency to address CC and disasters has produced several 
international strategies, principles and agreements that states, international 
agencies, disaster experts, and many others have signed up to and are 
implementing. Some of these agreements and principles include the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA), do-no-harm, strengthening resilience, reducing 
vulnerability, and building back better. These new sets of regulations bring with 
it a different assembly of norms, actors, legitimations, and ideologies that are 
applied in land conflicts bearing multiple overlapping land policies. Interacting 
with existing political land processes and legal fields, these new regulations 
make the outcomes and nature of land conflicts increasingly unpredictable and 
complex, as noted earlier by Franco (2011). For instance, the Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC has accepted planned relocation as a CC adaptation 
strategy particularly to protect vulnerable coastal communities, low-lying areas, 
and small islands. This strategy though is double-edged. On the one hand, 
relocation may be inevitable in areas where it is physically impossible for 
communities to stay in their land. On the other, this strategy is being exploited 
by elite capitalists and some state actors to grab the lands of disaster-affected 
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communities (Adams et al. 2009, Klein 2007, Middleton and O'Keefe 1998, 
Reale and Handmer 2011).  
 
In the process of designing these plans, it is not just the material space but also 
its representations that are being transformed. Behind the relocation strategy is 
the assumption that rural poor communities are vulnerable and can be “tragic 
victims” of climate change if they are not relocated to safer areas. Their 
resilience and responsiveness are set aside and attention from the root causes 
of vulnerability is diverted (Farbotko 2005). These images can facilitate land 
grabs depending on the actors involved in the crisis, their representation of the 
space, and the values they attach to it. These images can also be used as consent 
mechanisms that if left unchallenged can become “natural” and hegemonic 
(Farbotko 2005). This resonates Harvey’s earlier call (see Chap 2 on discussion 
about space) for policies to consider context-specific dimensions of space and 
the tensions within it. The complex interplay of these legal fields and spaces 
provides the context for the protracted land battle under CARP.  
 
Adding to this complexity is the prevailing free market ideology which, Danny 
Carranza, National Coordinator of RIGHTS Network, says has buttressed the 
place of private property regime in its land policies and relegated social justice 
goals in the background:7   
 
The prevailing philosophy is we need to create more 
wealth…The state therefore does not want to interfere with 
business because it needs them. And because they do not want 
to interfere, they cannot protect the rights of people.8 
 
This regime manifested itself in the post-Haiyan situation of the country where 
the corporate elite was transformed into the state’s ‘co-shepherds’ helping to 
manage the massive funds coming from donors. The state, burdened by its 
bureaucratic processes, could not immediately release rehabilitation funds. With 
its political legitimacy at risk, the President had to call on the corporate elite to 
address this capacity gap given its relatively less bureaucratic procedures. In a 
document, entitled “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda” (RAY) (GOP 
2013:19), the state facilitated this new role of the elite through different 
modalities such as the expansion of public-private partnership arrangements 
and through adopt-a-town partnerships.  
 
This free market ideology strengthens the private property regime in the 
country and puts corporate elite interests over what should have been the state’s 
function of protecting people’s rights. Carranza says it is what triggers land 
grabs in the country: “The corporate elite in the Philippines has too much 
capital that it has to acquire lands and even get out of the country to invest.”9  
 
                                                 
7 RIGHTS network is a nationwide network of nongovernment organizations (NGO) 
in the Philippines supporting rural social movements. 
8 Personal interview with Danny Carranza at the RIGHTS Network office on 12 Aug 
2014 (hereafter, Carranza interview) 
9 Carranza, interview 
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But while this structural and institutional environment may have partly created 
past imbalances of power and wealth, Fox (1992) cautioned us earlier against 
attributing the outcomes of policies (e.g. land grabs) on these factors alone. 
This attribution presents a one-dimensional view of the state and a bifurcated 
picture of its relationship with capitalists and society (i.e. weak-strong, 
subordinate-dominant), both of which do not explain unexpected outcomes of 
policy reforms. In administering land deals, the state becomes a calculating 
agency where it exercises its autonomy and capacity to balance its political 
legitimacy and capital accumulation (Fox 1992). It is not a single entity but 
rather is composed of individual actors who decide, react, and respond to land 
reform issues based on their current spatial location. As we shall see in the next 
chapters, these create internal contradictions within the state that have 
produced some of its strong yet silent reactions against the free market 
ideology. These became the access routes and part of the policy currents that 
not necessarily guaranteed the success of CARP but nonetheless determined its 
nature, pace, and trajectory. 
 
More than land titles, land grabbing is about rights being violated.10 But the 
state, Carranza says, is conflicted to protect these rights, especially land rights, 
since this would mean exercising their eminent domain over the land and 
regulating private interests: a move that is unacceptable in the free market 
world.  
 
Our state is not dependent but is being controlled by the 
corporate elite because of this ideology. The state cannot regulate 
the whole system that ensures the protection of rights. With this 
ideology, the state can sacrifice human rights in return for profits. 
And the profits do not necessarily have to go straight to its 
coffers for as long as these generate more profits.11 
 
Unless this ideology changes, he says, it would be difficult to find a common 
ground between the capitalist interests of the corporate elite and the rights of 
the people.12 And for O’Brien (1996:55), “So long as a gap exists between rights 
promised and rights delivered, there is always room for rightful resistance to 
emerge.” 
 
Such is the political and institutional landscape that Sicogon island finds itself 
in. 
  
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Chapter 4. The beginnings of the land battle 
 
The previous chapters gave us the analytical tools to study land conflicts and a 
preview of how these conflicts emerge from the complex legal and political 
environment of the Philippines. Chapters 4 and 5 this time take us to the land 
conflict under study. These sections investigate the history of the struggle, 
specifically how its trajectory was influenced by the interaction of pro-reform 
forces as it shapes and is shaped by the institutional and political environment 
(See Annex B for a concise recount of the land struggle before and after the 
disaster).  
 
Another island to be groomed 
 
Sicogon island is one of the small islands lying along the central portion of the 
Philippines and the northeast section of Iloilo province as shown in Figure 1. 
The island, which belongs to the Municipality of Carles, is composed of three 
villages, namely Buaya, San Fernando, and Alipata. Sicogon is home to around 
1,100 families, some of who have migrated to the island before the 1920s.13 A 
majority of the residents are artisanal fisherfolk. One or two own small 
passenger boats while a few work as public school teachers in the island or have 
menial contractual jobs in the mainland. There are no big landowners in the 
community. Most if not all remain dependent on artisanal fishing and backyard 
farming. Prior to the land dispute in the early 2000, the residents were able to 
farm their fields with domestic crops and gather driftwood in the forest. Since 
the dispute, they have been barred from going to their farms and had to live 
with planting fruit trees and vegetables in lands near their house.   
 
Seventy percent of the island is privately titled while the other thirty percent is 
classified as public and forest land. Buaya village is located within the titled 
property while the other two villages are located in the public land. SIDECO is 
the private firm owned by the Sarrosa family, a local elite family from a nearby 
province who built their fortune through the sugarcane business. The family 
bought a portion of the island in the 1970s from another influential family and 
turned this into a prime high-end tourism destination in the mid-1970s. The 
island easily attracted European tourists and local elite families because of its 
long wide stretch of white sand, hidden coves, abundant spring water, primary 
growth forest, and accessibility from the mainland. Edmund Sarrosa, vice-
president of SIDECO, said that the resort was profiting so much that it paid 
Php 30M (approx. €521T)14 worth of taxes to the municipality, a huge amount 
during that period.15  Its operation gradually stalled during and after the 1972 
martial law when the security situation in the country became unstable 
(communist insurgency was quite active in this area during that time) and when 
the sugarcane industry collapsed in the 1980s. At that time, the Sarrosa family 
tried to save the business by asking the municipal office to reclassify the land 
                                                 
13 Data extrapolated using the Population count as of May 2010 by the Philippine 
Statistics Authority - National Statistical Coordination Board (www.census.gov.ph). 
14 Exchange rate is €1= Php 57.53 (29 Aug 2014) (Source:  Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/) 
15 Personal interview with Edmund Sarrosa in Iloilo province on 23 July 2014 
(hereafter, Sarrosa interview) 
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into agricultural, which requires lesser tax. The municipal office reassessed the 
land, discovered that it was being used for agricultural purposes by the local 
communities and thus reclassified it as agricultural land in 1979. This move 
however was not enough to maintain the resort. By 1983, the Sarrosa family 
officially closed the business, leaving behind tax arrears and unpaid salaries and 
benefits of the employees, some of whom are from the local communities.   
 
Figure 1. Sketch map of Sicogon Island, Province of Iloilo, Philippines 
 
 
 
The island’s location among a cluster of other small islands makes it an 
attractive jump off point for building a multi-million dollar tourism complex. 
It is this potential that persuaded Ayala Corporation (Ayala Corp.) to forge a 
partnership with SIDECO to revive the island into a top tourist destination. 
Ayala Corp. is one of the top private holding companies based in the country’s 
capital city. Established in 1834, it is the oldest and largest Philippine business 
conglomerate in the country with a diverse business portfolio in real estate, 
financial services, telecommunications, water services, electronics, 
manufacturing services, business process outsourcing, power, and transport 
infrastructure (Ayala Corporation 2013). Apart from the Philippines, it has 
multiple businesses in China, Mexico, United States, and Europe.  
 
Ayala Corp. currently boasts of a market capital worth US$ 7.9B (Forbes 2014) 
and in the past five years alone has invested nearly US$ 11B across these 
business sectors, bringing their net value asset in the US and Asia alone to US$ 
211M (Ayala Corporation 2013). The company is the top real estate developer 
in the country. In an interview with the author, Marciano Paynor, external and 
media relations point person of Ayala for its Yolanda project,16 said that the 
company’s foray into the tourism industry has just began through the 
                                                 
16 Personal interview with Marciano Paynor at the Ayala Corporation office on 19 
August 2014 (hereafter, Paynor interview). Paynor was also a former ambassador of the 
Philippine government. 
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acquisition of hotels and development of resorts. Its plans in Sicogon is part of 
its aim of expanding its tourism portfolio (Benaning 2014), providing jobs, and 
supporting the national state’s thrust of attracting 10 million foreign tourists to 
the country by 2016 (Yap 2014).  Talks abound that other islands in this cluster 
have been targeted by Ayala Corp. to be part of the tourism business that it is 
planning not only in the province but in the region.  
 
The familiar narrative of land grabs in which financially-rich but resource-poor 
foreign states and investors are involved is not happening in Sicogon. The land 
struggle instead involves an alliance of the state, a local elite, and a big business 
conglomerate. As we shall see later, the alliance is a perfect symbiotic 
relationship where the state provides the legal and administrative support; the 
business conglomerate and its international network, technology and large 
capital stocks for expanding its tourism portfolio; and the local elite with its 
local political influence and network. 
 
Land struggle before typhoon Haiyan 
 
Composed of titled private lands, forestland, public land, and coastal areas, 
Sicogon island would naturally fall under the jurisdiction of several state 
agencies, each of whom have different guidelines on how the land should be 
appropriated and used based on their agenda and function. Bring in the local 
communities with their state-bestowed land entitlements and the local elite 
landowners with their own land titles, the island has become a site of struggle 
among these contending parties.  
 
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is the state agency in charge of 
implementing CARP. Its local office introduced CARP in Sicogon in 1994 
when it was still classified as an agricultural land. This prompted the landowners 
to ask local state officials and local agrarian reform officials to reclassify the 
land back as tourism area to exempt it from the Program.17 Apart from claiming 
that the resort helped transform Carles into a 2nd class municipality, the 
landowners also used the following arguments to legitimize their claims: First, 
no agricultural activities are being done in the island since the land is not arable 
in the first place. Rice and corn have not been planted. Standard farming 
practice normally performed in farming operations are not done in Sicogon. 
Second, agriculture cannot support the livelihood of the people. Dividing the 
land into smaller parcels among the CARP beneficiaries and allowing 
cultivation of root crops will only destroy the forest cover and the ecosystem. 
Third, the main source of livelihood of the people is fishing, therefore, the 
people are fisherfolks and not farmers. Fourth, a landlord-tenant relationship 
does not exist since SIDECO is not a landlord. Fifth, the requirements of 
tourism for structures and facilities such as golf courses and sports clubs are 
inconsistent with agricultural development. Tourism in the area will only allow 
limited agricultural production. Farming will remain subordinate to the needs 
of tourism. Hence, lands with slope less than 18o will be used for recreational 
facilities. Sixth, that people earned their livelihood through the resort alone. 
Hence, there is a possibility that people will sell and not cultivate the land once 
                                                 
17 Under the law, only alienable and disposable lands, public lands, and private lands 
devoted or suitable to agricultural activity can be covered by CARP.  
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it was titled to them. Seventh, the answer to the development problem is not 
to transform the people into farmers with 3 ha of unarable land that they cannot 
develop but the development envisioned by SIDECO. 
 
State actors like the Minister of Tourism, together with the local business 
councils, supported the landowners’ request probably because of the potential 
of the island to generate high tourism revenues. Successive municipal 
ordinances and resolutions declaring the island for tourism purposes were 
passed. The municipal office’s latest Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) 
and Zoning Plan from 2013-2022 indicates that except for the timberland, the 
whole island of Sicogon is a high-end tourism zone.18 Land allocated for 
agriculture was notably missing. Cerena Villanueva, local planning and 
development officer, said that a study was conducted by the local DAR office 
indicating that the island is not suitable for agriculture because of its rocky soil.19 
Francisco Canones, local agrarian reform officer, confirmed that such a study 
was indeed done, not at their level though, but by high level officials from their 
office. He disagrees with its results saying that the projection map that their 
office has of the island shows agricultural crops planted in the area.20 Agreeing 
with him is Riza Lapinig, local state assessor, who conducted a similar team 
study based on the actual use of the land and found it being used for agricultural 
purposes.21 As part of the CARP titling procedures, a multi-state agency 
inspection was also carried out which found that 335 ha of the private land 
meet the requirements of the Program. It was based on these findings that the 
regional director of DAR issued a Notice of Coverage informing the landowner 
that 335 ha of their land will be placed under CARP.22 
 
The issuance of this Notice prompted the landowners to turn to the judiciary. 
One civil case over another was filed against the regional DAR director and 
other officials who executed the Notice on the grounds that they violated 
CARP procedures. The landowners also repeatedly applied to DAR for an 
exemption from the Program, supporting this with official state documents and 
unofficial state letters declaring the island as either a commercial or tourism 
zone. This strategy of “forum shopping” in which landowners file similar cases 
to various courts and agencies most likely to provide favourable judgments is 
prevalent in the Philippines and has been used to delay titling procedures 
(Franco 2011). But not to be intimidated, the regional DAR director remained 
steadfast and declared two Order of Finality, making his decision final and 
executory at the local level.23 Sealing this decision is another Order of Finality 
                                                 
18 The CLUP is a long-term framework that directs public and private investments by 
identifying which areas can and cannot be developed. (DILG 2009). 
19 Personal interview with Cerena Villanueva at the Municipal Planning and 
Development office on 21 July 2014 (hereafter, Villanueva interview). 
20 Personal interview with Francisco Canones at the Municipal Agrarian Reform office 
on 22 July 2014. 
21 Personal interview with Riza Lapinig at the Municipal Assessor’s office on 21 July 
2014. 
22 These Notices are issued for CARP-covered private agricultural lands informing the 
landowner the size and location of the land being acquired. Once the Notice has been 
served to the landowners, DAR initiates the land acquisition and distribution process. 
23 Based on the DAR Administrative Order No. 06-11, an Order of Finality is a 
resolution issued by the Regional Director or the Secretary of the DAR or the Office 
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issued by the Minister of Agrarian Reform in April 2014. As expected, the 
landowners filed an appeal which is currently being discussed in the DAR. 
 
These incidents reflect the obscured parameters of juridical courts and state 
agencies, civil and legal laws that contending parties had to weave through to 
make their favoured policy authoritative. The elite landowners use local courts 
to threaten pro-reform state and social actors and to complicate the policy 
setting. It is a strategy to confuse the communities of the legal blitzkrieg, 
prolong the battle if necessary, exhaust people’s capacity to remain in battle, 
and ultimately dissuade them from pursuing the titles. On the other side, these 
incidents show that there are state actors who act independently of landowners’ 
influence but not necessarily independent of internal pressure from their 
agency. Following Fox’s earlier assertions, it is the initiatives of these state 
actors or the “access routes”, who do not necessarily come from one state 
agency or rank alone, that provide people their entry points to the state 
machinery. The Order of Finality is a huge feat for the people and the Program 
achieved with the help of these access routes.  
 
The landowners knew they have to exploit the plural legal situation of the island 
if they were to establish their ownership of it. Manoeuvring their way around 
the legal system, they extended their claims beyond the farmlands to cover the 
island’s public land and forestland. Through their local political network and 
influence, the landowners would be one step ahead of the people in obtaining 
management rights to these lands (see Appendices C and D for these accounts). 
This move again shows how overlapping policies produce conflicts and 
influence the decisions of contending groups regarding which state agency to 
engage with and institutional framework to invoke.   
 
Not content with the legal blitzkrieg, the landowners resorted to harassment to 
weaken people’s resolve. The harassment began in 2002 when PROGRESO, a 
nongovernment organization with expertise in militant community organizing 
and focus on agrarian reform initiatives, entered the community to assist the 
villagers to assert their land claims through the CARP framework. By 2003, 
there were 214 families that had applied as beneficiaries of the program. Some 
families failed to qualify either because their main source of livelihood was not 
farming or they were threatened by the landowners. Cases of illegal logging and 
notices of lawful eviction were filed against the farmer beneficiaries. Affidavits 
were executed by alleged program beneficiaries denying that they are bona fide 
tenants of the island and requesting the local DAR to cancel their names in the 
application. The harassment intensified in 2008 when the landowners declared 
“Huwes de Kutsilyo” (Justice by Knife) in the island. Two days after this 
declaration, an elderly woman was killed while gathering crops in her farm. The 
house of a leader was demolished by armed men. Firearms were planted outside 
the houses of farm leaders who were subsequently put to jail for alleged case of 
illegal possession of firearms. The people’s training centre was destroyed, crops 
were uprooted, and a shanty was set on fire.  Two houses were demolished 
when the people refused to leave.  
                                                 
of the President of the Philippines that contains the final decision of a court, quasi-
judicial body, or tribunal on cases involving the implementation of the agrarian law. 
Enforcement of the decision is the next action. 
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This repeated use of coercion and consent (recall discussion on Harvey) is a 
prevailing strategy throughout the land struggle. Until this point, consent was 
applied by surfacing misconceptions about the agricultural sector and pitting 
these against the market-constructed profitability of the tourism industry to 
garner policy support at all state levels. The plural legal situation of the country 
was exploited by the landowners to wring out people’s resources while abiding 
by the state’s legal system. Consent was complemented by coercive tactics, 
particularly against the farmer leaders, to stifle their leadership and threaten the 
beneficiaries from pursuing their application.   
 
If the story was to end here, these events would almost paint a bleak picture of 
the land struggle for the rural poor. But the conflict persists with local 
communities collectively mobilizing themselves to protest the harassments. 
Institutional policy reforms opened the space for landless rural poor farmers to 
claim ownership of lands they have tilled for years. But clearly an institutional 
opening does not automatically guarantee a pro-poor interpretation and 
implementation of the land law, as Franco (2011) reminds us. A collective legal 
and political action from below and above had to be done particularly in difficult 
and contentious situations (following the interactive approach). In early 2009, 
the people engaged in a ‘rightful resistance’ (recall discussion on O’Brien) by 
walking 140 km for six days towards the capital of the province to negotiate 
and demand their rights from state officials and expose their situation to the 
public. Shunning violent measures, the protest became a powerful act that 
revealed the tilted balance of power between the landowners and people, and 
the absence of state rule in the island. The name of their protest, “Exodus for 
Land, Life and Dignity,” explicitly shows how this act was nurtured by the failed 
commitment and pronouncement of the state to grant farmers their land under 
CARP. It also shows the values of equality and human rights upon which the 
resistance is firmly grounded upon. It was an act powerful enough to deter three 
foreign investors from pursuing their partnership with SIDECO.24 This act was 
picked up by both local and national media and one that gained new allies from 
the church and other human rights and social justice advocates. Among them 
are a senator, representative of AKBAYAN,25 and the Head of the National 
Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), and CBCP-NASSA26 - the social 
development arm of the Philippine Catholic Church – all of whom will be the 
policy currents (recall discussion on Fox) that will help push people’s demands 
within the new institutional arrangements.  
 
Cacique law in Sicogon overshadows the state law in similar ways that this 
occurs in other parts of the country, as discussed by Franco (2011). But people 
knew, and as advised by their NGO allies, that despite its weakness it is 
important that they have the state law behind their cause. Continuing their 
rightful resistance, they countered every civil case filed against them by the 
landowners with other court charges. For every abuse inflicted on them, the 
                                                 
24 Sarrosa, interview 
25 A political party which aims to pursue a progressive reform agenda and uphold 
democratic space in the country. 
26 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)- National Secretariat for 
Social Action-Justice and Peace (NASSA) 
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people reported to local police authorities and filed a case in local state courts. 
It was through this legal effort that they were granted a writ of amparo by the 
court which protected them from the harassments of the landowners – again, 
a significant feat for the farmers.27 In every step of the titling process, people 
made sure they followed the law, albeit misled at times by anti-reform state 
actors. To counter this, people armed themselves with knowledge of the law 
with the support of NGO allies, and used this to prepare legal counter 
arguments against the landowners’ appeals. The allies they gained from the 
protest became channels for people’s claims to be discussed at the national level 
and to push local state officials in their direction. Going back to Fox’s assertion 
earlier about autonomy and capacity, the incidents above reflect the degree of 
independence that people have in crafting the framework of their campaign. 
They have constructed their claims and based on these determined which 
agency to pressure and which specific policies to uphold. They maximized the 
policy currents and access routes to access the state machinery and pursue their 
claims.  
 
At this point, ownership of the farmland seems to be in favour of the people 
with the Order of Finality issued by the national DAR office. The forestland 
remains under the management of the landowners while the public land 
remains in contention. In the background, however, talks of a joint elite 
partnership venture between Ayala Corp. and SIDECO had started brewing, 
with the media sprawled with news of a Php 10 billion (approx. €173 million) 
planned tourism project in the island.  
 
Then typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in November 2013 and changed the 
game.  
  
                                                 
27 The writ of amparo “…is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty 
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of 
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity (Philippines Supreme 
Court 2007).”  
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Chapter 5: The land battle changes 
 
This chapter investigates how the institutional environment brought by 
disasters and CC intersected with pre-existing processes of the land conflict and 
how this interaction shapes and is shaped by the latter’s spatial, institutional, 
and political arrangements. The discussion pivots around the sources of 
institutional dynamism and its impact on the space and interaction of the state, 
capital, and society.  
 
Market-based, non-coercive strategies at play 
 
Haiyan was one of the largest and strongest typhoons in recorded history of 
the planet. Thousands of people were left without food, shelter, and other basic 
necessities as extreme high speed winds of approximately 300 km/hour 
brought 5m high sea waters towards coastal communities. Except for very few 
cemented structures, most of the houses were either washed away or destroyed. 
More than 6,000 people perished in central Philippines, and thousands of 
houses, fishing equipment, farms, and infrastructures were destroyed. It was a 
massive disaster. 
 
Burdened by its bureaucratic processes and structure and insufficient relief and 
rehabilitation funds, the state had to call on the corporate elite to serve as 
‘development sponsors’ of areas hit by the typhoon. They were asked to help 
rehabilitate four sectors: education, health, shelter and livelihood in each area 
that they will sponsor. In asking for the corporate elite’s support, the state made 
crucial calculations between 1) maintaining its political legitimacy to its people 
and the international humanitarian community by ensuring it immediately 
delivers the necessary humanitarian support and 2) continuing its capital 
accumulation especially after being touted as the fastest growing economy in 
Asia (Coface Group 2014, Mellor and Batino 2013). During the negotiations, 
Ayala Corp., one of the companies that pledged its support to the state, chose 
Iloilo since they have already targeted this province to be one of its future 
growth centres (Ayala 2012). According to Ayala’s Paynor, “Rehabilitating the 
four sectors is logical if you want to help an area and if you want to approach 
it from a holistic perspective.”28  
 
However, in Sicogon their plan is different. It will not receive support for the 
four sectors. In fact, their support in the area is merely coincidental as they 
happened to have business plans for it. Their ultimate plan is to remove the 
people and relocate them in the mainland where they had bought a land on 
which they built 200-300 houses for those who will choose to relocate.29  
 
The condition of the island after the typhoon was the “clean slate”, the 
“external other” that the powerful local and corporate elites were waiting for 
(recall discussion on Klein). As one relocatee aptly puts it, “When SIDECO 
could not drive the people away from the island, Typhoon Haiyan gave them 
                                                 
28 Paynor, interview 
29 Ibid. 
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that opportunity.30 Their combined plans of transforming the island into a high-
end tourism area, of becoming a prominent player in the tourism industry, and 
of developing the province into a growth centre have found what Harvey calls 
earlier as a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ after the disaster. The elite partnership knew 
that to succeed in their plans, they would have to immediately capitalize on the 
collective trauma of the people and the expressed incapacity of the state.  
 
Relief goods arrived intermittently the first weeks after the typhoon. When it 
arrived, the packages were distributed with prejudice to some families and were 
not enough to sustain a family of six for a week. The village captain of Buaya 
said he travelled the day after the typhoon to ask for relief goods from the local 
social welfare agency of the municipality. But its official promptly told him that 
it would be the first and last support they would give since Ayala Corp. is 
already supporting the island. Fuelling their desperation was when people saw 
how the security forces of the company would block boats carrying relief goods 
to the island and asking them to return to the mainland. SIDECO also 
prohibited them from repairing and rebuilding their homes. Humanitarian 
organizations like Save the Children wanted to provide them with shelter 
materials but were only allowed by SIDECO to provide school materials to the 
children. A British naval group was asked to leave the island by “3 big men” 
after providing tarpaulin and other relief assistance to the island for two days, 
without permission from the company. The people could not fish after their 
boats were carried away by seawater. ICCO Cooperation, a Dutch development 
organization, was able to provide 70 fishing boats a few months after the 
disaster. By then, people’s vulnerability and desire for survival were at peak 
levels. 
 
This paradoxical situation of scarcity and abundance was an opportune time for 
the dominant groups to apply non-coercive mechanisms. Merely offering cash 
support to remove people from the island was not an option as this would have 
placed the corporate elite’s image in a bad light and may not be sufficient to 
convince people to leave their lands. But by taking advantage of the disaster, 
the elite partnership created a condition of pressing need for survival, one that 
would force people to decide to leave the land without holding the elites 
responsible for their decision (recall discussion on Hilhorst and Jansen). It was 
a condition in which the options for negotiations are limited or an “all or 
nothing” situation.  
 
A week after the typhoon, a general assembly in each village was held by I-
Serve, the NGO hired by Ayala Corp.,31 to discuss the business conglomerate’s 
two offers to the villagers. Acceptance of either offer, according to the people, 
determined whether I-Serve will provide them with immediate relief goods or 
not. Looking at the nature of these offers, we are reminded of the factors 
                                                 
30 Personal interview with relocatees in Jolog village on 27 July 2014 (hereafter, Jolog 
relocatees interview). 
31 I-Serve indirectly operated in the island in early 2013 when they conducted 
community surveys. When asked by the people whether they are affiliated with Ayala, 
they gave a negative response. However, according to Ayala’s 2012 annual report, I-
Serve was the same NGO it contracted to conduct stakeholder mapping for one of its 
suburban community projects. (Ayala 2012). 
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identified earlier as affecting people’s calculations over land deals. The offers 
are as follows:  
 
 First option: The household will receive Php 150,000 (€2,607) 
only if they will waive their rights to their land, destroy their 
house, and permanently leave the island. If they have another 
family sharing their home, this family will receive Php 30,000 
(€521).  
 Second option:  The household will move to Jolog village where 
they will receive a house and lot at no cost. Along with these, 
they can also choose to receive either a start-up money of Php 
5,000 (€87) or materials for a banca (fishing boat). Titles to the 
house and lot will be given after three years, depending on how 
fast the state can process the title. Ayala Corp. will provide 
community facilities such as a fish landing, market, and school, 
and livelihood programs. Job opportunities either as 
construction workers or administration staff in the relocation 
site will be provided. They will receive a daily salary of Php 200-
300 (€3-5).  
 
The relocatees said that those who took the offers will be selected for 
employment in the resort, depending on the skills that they have. Those who 
refuse to take either of the offer and prefer to stay in the island will be litigated 
in court and will neither get cash nor a house and lot from Ayala Corp.  
 
As people’s desire for survival was stretched, a number of them relented and 
accepted the corporate elite’s offer. Permanently sealing the deal is an 
agreement between the company and the household which states that: 1) 
SIDECO is the registered owner of the 809 ha, 2) an admission by the 
household that they have no right to stay on the land, 3) the household has 
decided to relocate to the mainland after getting financial support from the 
landowners because of the damages sustained by their house from Typhoon 
Haiyan, 4) the household agreed to remove all structures in their lot,  5) waive 
all their cases and claims against the landowners and their company, and 6) 
withdraw their CARP application and membership in FESIFFA (the network 
of people’s organizations in the island in which the land claim makers are part 
of; in turn it is a member of a national militant peasant movement, Katarungan). 
In addition, the agreement stated that the household signed on their own 
volition and will not reclaim ownership of their property in the island.  
 
Challenging social mobilization from below  
 
With the agreement, the people found themselves thrust in business with the 
powerful actors under different terms of exclusion and inclusion. Those who 
signed the agreement gained the favour of the powerful elites and perceived 
their life now as “better”. Excluded from this “better” life are those who 
remained in the struggle (recall discussion on green grabs). The introduction of 
these market offers produced a mix of constructions of the land and challenged 
social mobilization from below.  
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A majority of the households who accepted the offers perceived the struggle as 
futile since they do not have titles to the land, are not eligible applicants of 
CARP, and share the belief that they are opposing a powerful group.32 They are 
relatively the more vulnerable families and therefore may choose the “better” 
option, that is, to receive the material and financial offers and hold on to the 
promise of employment (or incorporation into the business) (recall discussion 
on mobilizations from below). Land used to be an important asset for them. 
But without capital to revive farming, its utility is reduced, making its value 
easily replaceable by available cash aid. One household head said she wants to 
escape the conflict and have a quiet life with her family. Thus small 
inconveniences like paying for electricity and water which they consumed at no 
cost back in the island were seen as part of their share to have a better life.  
 
The often-heard remark on the obsolescence and antediluvian life in an island 
resurfaced and was highlighted in the remarks of relocatees in Jolog. Apart from 
changes in the material space, these remarks show the changes created by 
market-based incentives on people’s representation of their island and the 
experiences, values or the “lived” dimension they attach to it (recall discussion 
on space):33   
 
They told us, your children should not grow up like you who are 
dependent on just fishing. This is why they offered us other 
sources of livelihood. 
 
I do not want myself and my children to be ignorant in the island 
all my life.  
 
These negative perceptions of the struggle and the people involved in it may 
have been present before the typhoon. But with the changes in their space 
caused by the disaster and the introduction of new institutions and its 
“entitlements”, these negative perceptions were reinforced and resurfaced.34  
 
Some of those staying in the forestland are relatively well-off. Yet 
they prefer to stay in the dilapidated tents. It is just a pretence to 
get other people’s support. 
 
Their views of the harassment cases also changed, claiming these are all false.35  
 
A number of residents who had decided otherwise either stayed in their villages 
or set up temporary tents near the timberland where they cannot easily be 
evicted by SIDECO and Ayala Corp. as it is state property. This group is 
composed of CARP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. They were also pushed 
to a subsistence crisis level, but instead of choosing the path of avoidance, they 
                                                 
32 The exact figure of people who took the offer cannot be established as of this 
writing. The records of I-Serve showed that there are 711 families that accepted the 
offer, which includes those families who shared house with another family. But this 
number has to be verified because, according to PROGRESO, this may include 
families that are not residents of the island or are relatives of I-Serve staff themselves.   
33 Jolog relocatees, interview 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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chose to struggle against expulsion. Their land rights are legally-backed up by 
the state (recall their significant legal victories). For the non-beneficiaries, they 
held on to their informal land rights and the promise of land sharing 
arrangements by the Program beneficiaries. Explaining their actions, they said:36  
 
We are not against development. We are even willing to 
surrender the 22 ha so that development of the airstrip can 
proceed in the island. What we want is to be allowed to stay in 
the island, continue our livelihood, and be part of the island’s 
development plans.  
 
We are already content with fishing and farming. It is all right if 
we are not employed by the resort.  
 
We learned to fight back not because the NGOs are telling us to 
fight. SIDECO and AYALA are not leaving anything for us and 
yet they want more from us. 
 
By applying consent and coercive tactics, the elites helped create cleavages 
within the community. Their differentiated reactions reflected the factors that 
influenced their political calculation of land deals. Those who took the offer 
felt they are close to the subsistence crisis level and the market offers became 
their means to remain above this level. Relocating to the mainland will protect 
them from SIDECO’s continuous harassment and legal retaliations. Their 
political opportunity structure would have been limited had they stayed in the 
island and continued with the struggle. For them, the island presented more 
threats than opportunities.  
 
On the other side, those who did not take the offer and continued their 
resistance framed their struggle differently. Their policy current has broadened 
and they have the Order of Finality to support their claims. Their political 
opportunity structure has more opportunities than threats. The struggle 
therefore was not perceived as futile but as potentially strengthening. They 
continue the struggle not only because their physical subsistence was threatened 
but also because their subsistence ethic and moral economy were challenged 
(recall discussion on Scott). Higher ideals and promised rights were broken and 
disrespected. And as shown in the previous chapter, it was in these ideals that 
people’s “rightful resistance” were grounded upon.   
 
Because the powerful elites have been encroaching on their space, the resisters 
set up an “independent” space where the cacique law is not honoured and one 
where they have full control over. The tent camp was set up in the forestland 
to protect themselves from the harassments of the dominant elites. The village 
captain of Buaya told me that he would rather sleep in the camp than at his 
home where he feels threatened.37 Local environment state officials have been 
forcing them to leave the forestland, using the Forestry Law as justification. But 
these were simply ignored by the people. More than a material space for 
                                                 
36 Personal interview with community members of Alipata on 24 July and Buaya and 
San Fernando on 25 July 2014. 
37 Ibid. 
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securing their lives, the tent camp became representations of people’s resistance 
to and freedom from the encroachment. It is their space for collective thinking 
and mobilization, where dialogues with national state officials, international and 
local support groups, and families take place. The camp is their manifestation 
of their autonomy and capacity. Thus, any attempts of encroachment from the 
despotic landlords and corporate elite were met by threats from the people. 
 
Maximizing the plural-legal setting of the country, their growing policy currents, 
and their additional identity as disaster survivors, the people applied for a 
presidential proclamation that will declare their temporary domain in the 
forestland as a permanent resettlement site. They called on the representatives 
of NAPC and AKBAYAN to facilitate the proclamation at the national level. 
They also tapped the Philippine Fisheries Code which supports the 
establishment of fisherfolk settlement areas near fishing grounds to support 
their claim. Together with their policy currents of state actors, they continued 
their negotiations with the corporate elite to produce an agreeable situation.  
 
The powerful elites meanwhile challenged the people’s struggle by resorting to 
the classic divide and rule tactic. They organized those who received the market 
offers and backed them up with material and financial support to file court 
cases against the other group. The Sicogon case therefore is not just a struggle 
between capitalists and people or state versus the people, as often depicted in 
popular literature on land deals. But it is these contentions plus the struggle 
within communities brought about by different configurations of the actors and 
impact on their space that comprise land conflicts in the island (this crystallizes 
earlier assertion of Borras and Franco 2013, and Harvey 2003).   
 
The humanitarian field was transformed by the land conflict. The swiftness of 
the disaster and the time the options were laid out enabled the powerful elites 
to use humanitarian principles and actions to justify their market incentives. 
Humanitarian aid and economic payoffs were perceived as one. Despotic 
landlords and corporate elites became people’s benefactors. On the other hand, 
those who did not take the offer perceived the ‘humanitarian support’ (based 
on the agreement) as compensation for their expulsion. This was evident in 
their description of those who received the offer: “mga nagpabayad” or those who 
got paid. Alterations of humanitarian instruments and CC policies continue to 
be done by the corporate elite as we will see in the next section.   
 
Reworking spaces and institutions: A safe island for 
the privileged 
 
Weeks after the typhoon, the state implemented a no-dwelling zone policy 
which prohibits residents from setting up their homes within 40m from the 
high-water mark to the coastline. When strictly implemented, this policy would 
have rendered about 1,000 families in the island homeless. State agencies have 
contrasting views on this policy. For OPARR, it is not necessary that a blanket 
implementation of this law be done. In an official communication by the state, 
the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources states otherwise.  
 
31 
On the 40m easement, that’s all in the water code. We didn’t put 
that policy in. In fact for us it doesn’t make sense, we find that 
in the water code and it’s supposed to be an easement but for us 
it’s not necessarily unsafe if you’re in the easement. – Karen 
Jimeno, Head of Communications, OPARR38 
 
It is clear in the law that we cannot allow people to build houses 
in areas for mangroves and beach forest… (This) necessitates a 
display of political will from their local government officials to 
restore their mangrove areas and beach forests…Had the 
mangroves in Leyte and Eastern Samar not been decimated, the 
storm surge in those areas would have been dissipated by 70 to 
80 percent of its strength. – Ramon Paje, Minister of 
Environment and Natural Resources (GOP 2013) 
  
This policy has been latent for years but was resurfaced not only because of the 
risks posed by extreme weather related events but also because of the demands 
of the new institutional environment the state finds itself in (recall discussion 
on institutional dynamism). As an archipelagic country constantly hit by no less 
than 20 typhoons per year, there is internal and external pressure for the state 
to address people’s vulnerability. Its political legitimacy not only to its people 
but also to international bodies as a signatory to the HFA is at stake. The state 
is obliged to accomplish the HFA’s five priorities for action, one of which is 
“reducing underlying disaster risk factors, whether social, economic, 
environmental or land use” (UNISDR 2013:3). Thus, as a knee-jerk reaction to 
the disaster, the state ordered the relocation of high-risk areas such as low-lying 
and coastal communities to safe zones. In its Php 160 billion (approx. €2.6B) 
masterplan39 for rebuilding the typhoon-hit areas, the state plans to relocate 
around 1million people living in coastal zones considered as high-risk areas 
(Gabieta et.al 2014). It is worthwhile to note though that while relocation is 
internationally recognized as an adaptation strategy, the IPCC (2007) 
recommends this with caution stating the need to study several uncertainties 
(e.g. political instability) that can interact with these CC policy responses and 
reverse its intended impact. In the same breath, it also recognizes that CC 
drivers and impacts are shaped by existing socioeconomic conditions and 
institutional settings.  
 
Often, settlements exist in a splintered political landscape that 
makes coherent collaborative adaptation strategies difficult to 
contemplate. (IPCC 2007:382) 
 
It is this reciprocal relationship between CC policies and the political processes 
occurring in land conflicts that some state actors failed to consider when they 
executed this policy and the relocation strategy. Balancing capital accumulation 
and political legitimacy, and influenced by their current sociopolitical location, 
                                                 
38 Personal interview Karen Jimeno at the OPARR office on 6 August 2014 (hereafter, 
Jimeno interview) 
39 Eight months after the typhoon hit the country, OPARR came up with a 
Comprehensive Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan for areas hit by Typhoon 
Haiyan. This plan, according to Jimeno, took a long time to finish because OPARR 
decided to combine the assessments at the national and local levels of the state. 
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these state actors conceive and execute policies as if these occur in a political 
vacuum where only its intended outcomes are produced.  
 
IPCC’s stance on relocation is supported by Efren Godilano, a CC expert hired 
by OPARR to help put CC projections in the multi-hazard map for Sicogon 
island. For him, relocation is always the last resort.40 The multi-hazard risk map 
(see Figure 2) shows that it is not a safe area since all portions of it have different 
levels of risks.41 A big portion of the island has risk levels running from high to 
extremely high. However, he quickly points out that this does not mean 
relocation is the only solution for the communities.42  
 
We can still have fisherfolk settlements and a tourism industry in 
the island provided that appropriate mitigation structures 
corresponding to the risks involved are installed. This will entail 
costs. The higher you go up the risk level, the higher the costs. 
We can always do something about it. The question is who will 
shoulder the costs? 
 
This question was answered in my interview with Ayala’s Paynor:43 
 
There are mitigating factors. You can build but you have to do 
this, which the people don’t have the money for but which a 
resort can do. So if you put a high-rise building there, even if you 
have a storm surge of two-storeys high but you have an eight-
storey high building, then you’re okay. There are many ways of 
in a sense skinning the cat. But if left on its own and people who 
don’t know exactly what this means just a want a piece of land 
to put in their flimsy homes, when the rains come and they’re 
washed away guess whose fault it is.    
 
But as Godilano remarked, “The maps indicate that there are no safe areas in 
the island. But it does not mean that it cannot be made safe. Appropriate 
interventions can be constructed based on the hazard and risk involved. We 
only have to look at Japan to say that it is possible to do this.”44 And yet, a one-
track market-led decision to relocate people is often imposed by the state in 
favour of the corporate elite. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Personal interview with Efren Godilano at the OPARR office on 18 August 2014 
(hereafter, Godilano interview). 
41 According to Godilano, the probability of extreme weather related events like 
typhoon Haiyan occurring in the future can already be estimated through CC 
projections. These projections should be included in existing multi-hazard maps since 
these events are now considered the ‘new’ normal. He says that these projections were 
not included in the multi-hazard maps produced by the DENR for identifying the 
relocation sites in typhoon Haiyan areas. This implies that these sites may be safe from 
the other hazards but not from extreme weather events. 
42 Godilano, interview 
43 Paynor, interview 
44 Godilano, interview 
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Figure 2. Risk map of Sicogon Island 
 
 
Source: Efren Godilano, consultant, OPARR 
 
Hazard maps and the 40m easement policy are some of the state instruments 
originally intended to ensure that populations are kept safe from coastal 
flooding. These instruments become focal points of negotiations particularly 
when applied by new actors in land conflicts and their new goals. From its 
primary intention of saving lives, these “old” institutions are now used for other 
ends by dominant actors and given different meanings when applied in land 
conflicts (recall Steinmo and Thelen). International and national calls for 
“building back better”, “safe and secure settlements”, and other narratives of 
legitimation around DRM and CC justified the powerful elites’ argument for 
relocation: local communities do not have the means to keep themselves safe 
in the island while the corporate elite has the capital to abide by these calls by 
making the island safe for everyone (recall discussion on “green grabs”). These 
events show the dynamic relationship among the institutions of CC, disaster 
and land grabs. As these institutions recast the space and political arrangements 
of land conflicts so do the politics of land grabs reconfigure the meanings and 
intent of CC and disaster-related institutions.   
 
No state in a private island 
 
Franco (2011) writes about ‘laws’ in private plantations and haciendas, and 
refers to ‘batas ng hacienda’ (law of the hacienda) where the state exercises less 
34 
authority inside private spaces controlled by despotic landlords. It is similar in 
Sicogon – only that the entire island seems to be governed by private elites. It 
is a key political setting for how land conflicts intersect with disaster responses 
and CC adaptation strategies. Referring to Carranza’s point earlier, it is the 
private property regime that has held back the state from fully supporting 
typhoon-affected communities like Sicogon that are located in private areas. 
The absence of a rehabilitation plan for the island explicitly demonstrates this.  
 
We do not have a rehabilitation plan for Sicogon because it is a 
private land. The one who should do it is SIDECO, the private 
firm that owns the land. What we do is we wait for their plans so 
that we can include it in the municipality’s overall rehabilitation 
plan. That’s the time we can monitor it.45   
   
The same dilemma was expressed by Jimeno in an interview with the author.46  
 
This goes beyond rehabilitation. You have here property rights 
issues. To the extent that this is private property, we really cannot 
build back there regardless of any issues. It is beyond OPARR’s 
mandate….So their problem is that if they are already occupying 
this (land) and this is private property they really cannot rebuild 
there not because of any policy related to rehabilitation but 
because of property law. We cannot advocate for them because 
it’s beyond our control. This remains private property unless 
there are expropriation proceedings.  
 
The state’s mandate therefore can cover the residents of Sicogon if they are 
part of the comprehensive recovery plan that OPARR will monitor and 
evaluate. Unfortunately, the reverse is true for Sicogon. Without the mandated 
agency and local state officials to look after the condition of the farmers, where 
does this put the political legitimacy of the state? Which group is responsible 
for ensuring that people’s rights are upheld? 
 
In a disaster situation where needs swiftly change and funds for rehabilitation 
and recovery had to be immediately released, the state calculates the best move 
to balance its dual functions. By calling on the corporate elites’ support, the 
state assumed that it had this balance. While the state may refute this, such an 
arrangement has put its control over the rehabilitation agenda in a flux. If the 
corporate elites retract from their commitments for some reason, this disrupts 
the rehabilitation efforts and possibly jeopardizes both state functions (recall 
discussion on Fox). With capital in the hands of the corporate elite, to what 
extent then can the state exercise its sovereignty over lands “adopted” by the 
corporate elite while balancing its dual albeit contradictory functions? In the 
case of Sicogon, the island has become “untouchable” to the state simply 
because it is a private land with supposedly private sponsors. But when post-
disaster situation deals with people’s lives at risk, how can the state step in, 
exercise its eminent domain over the land, and uphold the rights of the 
                                                 
45 Villanueva, interview 
46 Jimeno, interview  
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communities? How does it calculate its move? How does it tame monopolistic 
power over its people and natural resources?  
 
A compromised deal: the outcome of a protracted 
battle 
 
In 8 November 2014, the four-decade old battle between SIDECO and the 
farmers came to a resolution as both parties together with Ayala Corp. and state 
officials arrived at a compromise. The negotiation was mediated by the farmers’ 
policy currents: NAPC, AKBAYAN, CBCP-NASSA, PROGRESO and ICCO. 
The agreement provides the farmers with P50M (approx. €833T) for its 
livelihood projects, a 30 ha resettlement site for the 784 household members 
of FESIFFA, 40 ha agricultural lands for the CARP beneficiaries, 10 ha for the 
fish shelter in the current site of the tent camp, and homelots measuring 150 
sqm for non-beneficiaries of CARP and 250 sqm for the beneficiaries. A 
collective title will be granted to the Program beneficiaries for the 40 ha 
agricultural land and a collective tenurial title will be given to the homeowners’ 
association that will be set up by the people to discourage land selling. NAPC 
will provide the houses for the people.  
 
Though fractured but not weakened, the farmers knew a compromise is the 
‘second best’ option having fought a protracted battle while remaining hopeful 
that they will benefit from the tourism business. The agreement was a 
compromise for all groups: the people had to withdraw its application under 
CARP (except those specified in the agreement) while the dominant elites also 
had to surrender some of the land for the people to use. All of them lost but 
gained parts of their claim. Ultimately, Ayala and SIDECO got what they 
wanted: land – not entirely, but largely. 
 
  
36 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
The study began with this question: How do land grabs shape and are shaped 
by climate change and disaster-related adaptation strategies, policies and 
principles? Its answer is this: When the new institutional environment around 
climate change and disaster intersect with the prevailing political processes of 
land grabs, the political, institutional and spatial arrangements embedded in the 
conflict are reconfigured. Conversely, the institutions of CC and disasters are 
recast and used for different ends as it interacts with the politics of land grabs.  
Powerful capitalists, together with their allies within the state, attempt to grab 
the clean slate as a result of the disaster. But this is not a one-way political 
dynamic. While not all people resist land grabbing, some do. Those who 
resisted land grabs forge alliance with groups of supports from within the state 
and in society. The political contestations that ensued are then largely 
conditioned by pre-existing social structures as well as existing institutions – 
some of which facilitate, others hinder, efforts of poor people to resist. It is the 
actual balance of power between these two contending factions of state-societal 
forces that determine the character of policy process and shape outcomes. In 
this particular case, a successful land grab for the capitalist, and a partial victory 
for the resisters. 
 
Climate change and disasters introduced the crucial element of time. The local 
landowners engaged the people in a long legal and violent struggle. But it is the 
political influence and introduction of massive amounts of capital at an 
opportune time by the business conglomerate that shifted the momentum of 
the struggle. It should be remembered that this time of scarcity was triggered 
by the typhoon but was created by the powerful elites (e.g. slow and infrequent 
delivery of relief, apt timing for introducing market offers). It was a situation 
that the poor people and their allies were not able to predict and prepare for. 
And yet it was a time that the capitalists were prepared to create and exploit. By 
the time they had regrouped, the capitalists have tilted the balance of power 
that in turn influenced the outcome of the struggle. In just a year after the 
typhoon occurred, the four-decade long struggle reached a decision.   
 
The reconstruction of humanitarian principles and CC adaptation strategies by 
corporate elites further complicates land conflicts as subjectivities emerge and 
are debated on. Land grab in this case was facilitated by these subjectivities by 
subsuming it under the broader humanitarian and climate change fields. This 
threatens not only the integrity of these fields but also challenges the operations 
of rural social movement organizations and humanitarian and development 
NGOs. In many cases the operation of these groups is limited to either the 
development, climate change, or humanitarian field. And yet, the case of 
Sicogon shows that all fields can be present in one site. Additionally, the four 
agrarian political economy questions earlier cited generate new dynamics and 
multi-scalar complexities when applied to the elements of the nexus. As noted 
above, the Sicogon case shows the swift transformation of institutions as they 
intersect. It also shows how these are swiftly changed by interactions of state, 
society and capital. The capitalists were able to immediately adapt to and 
maximize to these changes. Social reform and humanitarian groups should be 
able to do the same. Concurrent rework will have to be done to the institutional 
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parameters and strategies of these groups to adapt to these dynamics and grasp 
and address the new challenges it brings.   
 
Climate change and disasters brought in new actors like CC experts and the 
field of CC science into the land conflict. However their role and 
recommendations remain external to negotiations around it. Only those tools 
and recommendations that work in favour of dominant groups are taken up 
and accepted. As the study shows, capitalists take advantage of these tools to 
reinforce the vulnerability of the poor people while legitimizing their presence 
and operations. These tools and recommendations of science will continue to 
acquire different interpretations and used for ends other than it was originally 
intended for in sites of land conflict.  
 
Within the state, the contradictions and political dynamics among state agencies 
(e.g. the weather bureau and the DENR) and state actors largely influence 
whether CC science will be included in policy design and implementation. But 
as earlier revealed, CC science was not considered in the state’s multi-billion 
rehabilitation plan, making it vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The 
1M people targeted to be relocated by the state and the 205,000 new homes 
that will be constructed may thus be safe from earthquakes and other hazards, 
but not to extreme weather events like typhoon Haiyan. Located within the 
nexus, the relocation sites of these families can potentially become sites of 
future land grabs if not addressed.   
 
The notions on political legitimacy and capital accumulation both highlighted 
in Fox (1992) and Harvey (2003) have been traditionally applied to studying the 
state. However, the actions of the corporate elite in Sicogon show that these 
contradictory tasks also confront capital. It is inconceivable to see capital just 
going for accumulation unmindful of legitimacy considerations. We see this 
dilemma by capital at play in this case. Ayala Corp. is a huge business 
conglomerate that is known for its promotion of ‘corporate social 
responsibility.’47 Maintaining this political legitimacy to the public, its 
shareholders, and to the larger business community is therefore important, lest 
it experiences the fate of SIDECO (when investors pulled out after the people’s 
well-publicized resistance). Simultaneously, it has to keep accumulating capital 
and creating an “external” other to maintain its stature. In balancing these 
functions, it does not operate on its own but rather taps into its political 
network and transforms the humanitarian principles to legitimize its operations 
and weaken ground resistance. Ultimately, the Sicogon case is a clear case of 
land grabbing made legitimate with the concession given to the poor people 
who were driven from their land – but land grabbing just the same. 
 
Incidents of land grabs continue to rise, worldwide. These have become even 
more alarming as it intersects with climate change-related hazards that are 
increasing not only in numbers but in intensity as well, as evidenced by typhoon 
Haiyan. CC discourse brings with it a new institutional environment that is 
highly subjective and value-driven, and therefore easy to manipulate to favour 
an interest. In central Philippines alone, the government talks about relocating 
1 million people from their traditional coastal residence. We just studied a small 
                                                 
47 Paynor, interview 
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community involving a few hundred people. It is not difficult to extrapolate 
possible similar scenarios – just in central Philippines and just those linked to 
typhoon Haiyan. If we assume that climate change is here to stay with humanity 
for a while, and global land rush is not slowing down, then the critical 
intersection examined in this study will be a central development challenge 
internationally. 
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Appendix A 
List of People Interviewed 
  
NAME OFFICE DATE 
Bong Baltazar PROGRESO July 21 
Lirio Cordova PROGRESO July 21 
Riza Lapinig Municipal Assessor 
Municipality of Carles 
July 21 
Cerena Villanueva Municipal Planning Division Officer 
Municipality of Carles 
July 21 
Dr. Warlito Abad III Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction 
Management Officer 
Municipality of Carles 
July 21 
Luis Casiple  Staff 
DENR Region VI 
July 21 
Francisco Canones  Municipal Agrarian Officer 
Municipality of Carles 
July 22 
Salvador Manglinong  Officer-in-charge 
CENRO Office 
July 23 
Edmund Sarrosa  Vice-president 
SIDECO 
July 23 
Community members  Alipata village July 24 
Community members   San Fernando village July 25 
Community members  Buaya village July 25 
Raul Ramos  President 
FESIFFA 
July 25 
Sicogon relocatees Jolog village July 27 
Karen Jimeno  Head of Communications 
OPARR 
Aug 6 
Billy dela Rosa  Program Officer 
ICCO 
Aug 4 
Mary Ann Manahan  Program Officer 
Focus on the Global South 
July 31 
Clarissa Militante  Coordinator, Philippines Program 
FOCUS on the Global South 
July 31 
Ramon Paje  Minister 
DENR 
Aug 7 
Jim Sampulna  Regional Director 
DENR Region VI 
Aug 8 
Danny Carranza  National Coordinator 
RIGHTS Network 
Aug 12 
Marciano Paynor External and Media Relations Yolanda project 
Ayala Corp.  
Aug 19 
Alex Lorayes  Vice-president 
LandBank 
Aug 15 
Romulo Sumacolob 
(phone interview)  
Engineer 
DENR Region VI 
Aug 15 
Efren Godilano climate change specialist 
OPARR 
Aug 18 
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Appendix B 
Chronology of Events 
PERIOD EVENTS 
1896 Aniceto Lacson acquired the title to the island from Ramon Fontanet.  
1914 A cadastral survey was done stating that the island is 1,094 ha, composed of 809 ha private 
land plus 282 ha public timberland. 
1970 A second cadastral survey was done by the DENR indicating that the island is 1,163 ha, 
composed of 72 ha public land, 809 ha private land, and 282 ha timberland.  
1972 Aniceto Lacson transferred the land title to the Sarrosa brothers, owners of sugarcane 
plantations in the region.  
1976 SIDECO started its tourism business. Residents of San Fernando village were forced to 
relocate to Alipata village to give way to the construction of the airstrip and the resort. 
1977 A marginal note in a letter written by former Pres. Marcos approved SIDECO’s request 
for the island to be included in the list of Tourism Priority Areas under PD 535. 
1978 The municipal government of Carles declared the island as a tourism / commercial / 
residential area. 
1979 To cope with the collapse of the sugarcane industry, the Sarrosa family asked the municipal 
government to reclassify their land from tourism to agricultural zone to lower the tax 
requirements.   
1983 The resort officially closed.  
1988 The Philippine government enacted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program on 15 
June 1988.  
1989 SIDECO was granted management rights to the 282 ha forestland by the DENR Region 
VI.  
1994 The SIDECO property was placed under Compulsory Acquisition of the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Program. Two hundred farmers were identified as beneficiaries. The 
Sarrosa brothers requested the DAR to reclassify the island back into a tourism area to 
exempt it from the Program. 
1996-1998 A series of cases involving illegal logging and ejection were filed by SIDECO against the 
Program beneficiaries.  
2002 PROGRESO entered the island to help the government implement CARP. 
2003 A Notice of Coverage from Municipal DAR was sent to SIDECO informing them that 
335 ha of the private land will be placed under CARP.   
2004 Harassment against the people by the landowners escalated.  
An investigation by a multi-agency government team concluded that the 335 ha meets the 
requirements of CARP.  
A letter was sent to the DENR Provincial office by the Department of Tourism Regional 
office stating that Sicogon is classified as a tourism priority area. 
Affidavits of Denial were allegedly executed by farmer-beneficiaries denying that they are 
bona fide tenants of the island and requested DAR to cancel their names in the applicants’ 
list. 
SIDECO opposed the inclusion of their land in CARP through a formal communication 
addressed to the DAR regional office.   
2005 SIDECO filed an Application for Exemption/Exclusion to DAR Region VI stating that 
the land is devoted for tourism. 
2006 Houses of farmer leaders were raided by security forces of SIDECO.  
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The farmers applied for the CBFM program. It was disapproved by the DENR because 
SIDECO still had management rights over the forestland. 
Successive inspections were conducted by the local DAR office, all of which concluded 
that the 335 ha of land is eligible under CARP.  
SIDECO filed a civil case against the local DAR staff and asked for the nullification of 
the Notice of Coverage.  
2008 SIDECO declared “Huwes de Kutsilyo” (Justice by Knife) in the island. Harassment and 
a series of court cases were filed against the farmers. They were also prohibited to farm 
their lands and to collect forest products from the forest. People retaliated by filing a case 
of qualified theft and robbery against SIDECO. 
Management rights of SIDECO to the forestland were revoked by DENR Central Office 
on 24 April 2008.  
DENR conducted another survey. Results of the survey stated that 72 ha of public land 
exist. The local DENR office advised people to comply with necessary requirements for 
free patents. A Regional Trial Court Certification requested by the local DAR also stated 
that the 22 ha exists within the public land. Twenty-four farmers applied at the DENR 
Reg VI for free patents to the 22 ha.  
2009 SIDECO issued an ’Eviction Notice’ to the farmers. People were given 15 days to vacate 
their areas. When they refused to leave, two houses were demolished.  
The farmers travelled on foot for 140 km from the island to the main city of the province 
to protest the harassments of SIDECO and demand for their land under the CARP 
program.  
An Order of Finality was issued by DAR Region VI officially placing 335 ha of land under 
CARP.  
SIDECO opposed the DAR’s Order of Finality. 
The municipal government of Carles passed another resolution allocating the island for 
tourism purposes and giving SIDECO the co-management rights to the watershed of the 
island.  
The DENR Region VI issued free patents to the 22 ha to 16 claimants. These claimants 
are not residents of the place and are employees of SIDECO.  
2010 DAR Reg VI declared the Order of Finality as final and executory. 
The local municipal government of Carles approved an ordinance declaring the 809 ha as 
a tourism zone. It also approved its Forest and Land Use Plan. 
DENR Reg VI granted SIDECO management rights to the 282 ha timberland under its 
Adopt-A-Mountain Program.  
2011 The League of Governors of the region endorsed Sicogon as a tourism priority zone. 
The Regional Trial Court denied all the petitions of SIDECO and maintained the Order 
of Finality by DAR declaring 335 ha of land under CARP.  
The head of DENR Reg VI sent a position-letter to the Minister of Agrarian Reform 
recommending the exemption of Sicogon island from CARP because it is the focus of 
several foreign-assisted projects of the DENR and it serves as the reintroduction site for 
the Philippine Spotted Deer.  
A certification from the Municipal Zoning Office was released confirming that Sicogon 
has been used for commercial purposes since 1972. 
2013 Early 2013. Negotiations between Ayala and SIDECO for a partnership venture begins.  
I-serve started operating in the area indirectly by hiring local people to do community 
surveys. People asked them whether they were affiliated with Ayala. They denied this.  
The local government of Carles approved its Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning 
Plan 2013-2022 which shows that the island is a high-end tourism area. Agricultural land 
in Sicogon is notably absent. 
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Oct 2013. A writ of amparo was issued against SIDECO to stop the harassment of 
Sicogon residents. Cases of harassment decreased.  
Nov 2013. Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines. Ayala offered two market incentives to 
the farmers.  
2014 The Government of the Philippines declared a 40-meter “no dwelling zone” policy in 
typhoon-hit areas.   
1st quarter of 2014. Ayala and SIDECO’s partnership was forged. I-Serve officially 
established an office in the island to process the documents of those who accepted the 
market offers. SIDECO applied for an exemption from CARP for its 809 ha of land. This 
was subsequently dismissed by the Minister of DAR.  
 The residents of Buaya village set up tents in the timberland. They also re-applied for 
CBFM. 
The local DENR office ordered the people to vacate the timberland as it violates the 
country’s Forestry Code. The letter stated that the people’s CBFM application may be 
affected by their unlawful act.  
June 2014. The DENR Reg VI office declared that the 72ha does not exist and the 
previous cadastral survey results were erroneous. They said that they will revoke the free 
patents issued earlier by their Department.  
July 2014. Buaya village issued a resolution requesting the DENR to declare the 30 ha 
forestland that they are occupying as permanent fisherfolk settlement area for the affected 
families of typhoon Haiyan and for an appropriate tenurial instrument to be issued to 
them  
Nov 2014 The four-decade long land struggle ended with the people as represented by 
FESIFFA, Ayala Corp., SIDECO, and representative state officials signing a compromise 
agreement.  
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Appendix C  
Where did the 72 hectares of public land go? 
 
As the conflict persists and trust for fair negotiation thins out, the powerful 
elites, much like the social actors, have been exhausting all access routes and 
manoeuvring their way around state instrumentalities using their political 
influence to take hold of the remaining portions of the island.  
 
The ownership of 72 ha of public land where two villages lie is one of those 
portions. In April 2008, 24 community members applied to the local 
environmental office for emancipation patents on 22 ha of land located within 
the 72 ha. These patents are land titles granted to tenant farmers on 3 to 5 
hectares of private agricultural lands that they are tilling (GOP 1972).  As part 
of the standard procedures, the local environment office conducted an ocular 
survey of the area the following month where they confirmed the existence of 
the public land. The applicants were advised by the local environment officer 
to complete the requirements of the free patent application. But to the 
applicants’ surprise, they discovered that the local environment office issued 
the following year free patents to 16 claimants who were not among the 24 
applicants. It turns out that those who got the patents are not residents of the 
island but are employees of SIDECO. This was confirmed in my interview with 
Sarrosa who said that they did this to prevent the state and the people from 
taking the 72 ha and claiming it under CARP. The people protested by filing 
complaints to the regional environment office, which ironically was the office 
that issued the free patents.  
 
In a multistate agency dialogue four years after, this issue was again taken up, 
once more with surprising results favouring the private elites. The people 
requested the DENR to survey the 72 ha piece of land where the free patents 
have been issued to contest the titles. But they were surprised when they saw 
the survey results. In my interview with Romulo Sumacolob, one of the 
members of the DENR team that conducted the survey of the island, the map 
they used as basis for doing the 2014 survey was the one produced from the 
second and last cadastral survey of the island in 1970. The first survey was done 
in 1914 which declared the area as 1,094 ha composed of 809 ha of alienable 
and disposable land and 284 ha of timberland. The confusion emerged after the 
1970 map came out where an additional 72 ha was cited, thus increasing the 
island’s size to 1,163 ha. According to Sumacolob, it turns out that the 
coordinates of the cadastral survey marker shown in the 1970 map are different 
from the actual location of the markers in the island cited in the 1914 survey. 
Sumacolob and his team discovered that the coordinates of the markers in the 
1970 map actually lie in the waters of the Sicogon channel whereas the actual 
markers produced by the 1914 survey are still located in the same place in the 
island. This discovery led his team to conclude that the 72 ha does not exist and 
that the size of the island is only 1,092 ha, as stated in the 1914 survey.  
 
Given these findings, Sumacolob and his regional director said that they will 
revoke the free patents issued by their Department to the 16 claimants – a 
conclusion countered by the Minister of the same department who, in my 
49 
interview with him, said that only the Supreme Court and not a state agency 
can cancel the free patents.  
 
This finding has two important implications. First, the state actors have varying 
degrees of autonomy and capacity, and range of interests that affected the 
agency’s management of the forestland. Second, the tenurial security of two 
villages which the recent survey says are actually located within the titled 
property of SIDECO and not in a public land is at risk.  
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Appendix D 
Fire in the forest 
 
The last piece of land under contention is the 282 ha public forestland. In 1989 
SIDECO was granted management rights to this land for an indefinite time 
period by the regional environment office under Department Administrative 
Order (DAO) 5 Series of 1989. Because of the existence of these rights, this 
office did not approve the application of the people to be part of the 
Community-based Forest Management (CBFM) Program in 2006. This 
program would have given the people co-management rights to use, develop, 
and protect the forestland and resources for 25 years. In April 2008, SIDECO’s 
management rights were revoked by the national environment office. Two 
years after, the local state approved its Forest and Land Use Plan, where local 
communities are eligible to pursue their application for CBFM. However, in 
the same year, instead of processing the CBFM application of the people, the 
regional environment office once more granted SIDECO with management 
rights over the forestland through its Adopt-A-Mountain program. This 
Program of the DENR has similar goals as the CBFM,that is, to restore 
denuded forestlands by involving local communities in developing, maintaining 
and protecting forest plantations (DENR 1998). Why these overlapping 
programs are allowed to co-exist within and across state agencies have been 
subjects of several studies (Franco 2011, Prill-Brett 1994, Prill-Brett 2007, 
Borras 2007). In the end, the people’s application for co-management of the 
forestland once more was set aside.  
 
